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I. INTRODUCTION: NICARAGUA-A BEAUTIFUL
AND BRAVE LAND
Nicaragua's landscape rises, lush and tropical, from the Caribbean
coast into a cooler, mountainous interior.' From there, it descends
majestically onto a narrow, Pacific coastal plain punctuated by vol-2
canoes. The country's approximately 4.5 million people inhabit an
area slightly larger than New York State, bordered by Honduras and
1. For a discussion of Nicaragua's climate, economy, geography, government,
history, and people, see generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTES:




Costa Rica on the north and south, respectively. Theirs is a legacy
fraught with adversity. Nicaragua did not become an independent re-
public until 1838, after nearly three centuries of Spanish colonial
rule.4 Throughout the modem era, Nicaraguans have endured more
than their fair share of political and social turmoil, natural disasters,
and poverty.! Nicaraguan President Amoldo Aleman has described
his nation as "a beautiful and brave land that does not surrender to its
sorrows."6 Now it appears that Nicaraguan perseverance may be
paying off. Recent economic indicators promise a better life for Latin
Americans in general, and Nicaraguans in particular. In fact, ac-
cording to the United States Department of State, "Nicaragua now
appears poised for rapid economic growth." The reason: free market
economic reforms undertaken by Nicaraguan governments through-
out the 1990s have begun to bear fruit.
Consider the facts. Less than a quarter-century ago, Nicaragua was
a nation that had turned to communism,' and consequently, found it-
self in a perilous state of undeclared war with the United States.' To-




6. Remarks by President Arnoldo Aleinan of Nicaragui to Nicaraguan O/TI-
cials and the People of Posoltega, Nicaragua,. Mar. 8. 1999, LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, FED. NEWS SERV. File.
7. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE. supra note 1, at 6.
8. For a discussion of the ideology and tactics of the Sandinista regime that
ruled Nicaragua from 1979-1990, see generally ROGER MIRANDA & WILLIAM E.
RATLIFF, THE CIVIL WAR IN NICARAGUA: INSIDE THE SANDINISTAS (1994).
9. In 1986, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that U.S. support for
contra rebels opposed to Nicaragua's Sandinista government violated customary
international law. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicara-
gua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). According to the ICJ, illegal acts
committed by the United States against Nicaragua included mining Nicaraguan ter-
ritorial waters; arming, equipping, financing, and training contra rebel forces; and
attacking Nicaraguan ports and other facilities.
See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Ni-
car. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). For a discussion of the nefarious, covert op-
erational link between the anti-Sandinista contras and the United States Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), see generally GARY WEBB, DARK ALLIANCT: THE
CIA, THE CONTRAS, AND THE CRACK COCAINE EXPLOSION (1998).
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transforming itself from a centrally planned to a market economy,
and from a state of siege to one of peace and nascent prosperity."'
Since 1991, inflation in Nicaragua has dropped from a hyper-inflated
annual rate of 13,500 percent to roughly twelve percent, and the
country's foreign debt has been cut in half." Between 1989 and
1998, government spending was reduced from half the annual budget
to 8.4 percent of it.'2 Since 1996, the Nicaraguan economy has man-
aged to maintain at least moderate growth, accompanied by increased
private investment." The Nicaraguan government has privatized
some 351 state-run enterprises since 1991." Current government
policies should spur future growth by making Nicaragua more at-
tractive to foreign investors, who lately have taken a renewed interest
in Latin America.'1
Prospective investors will find that Nicaragua has much to offer.
The country is rich in natural resources, most of which have yet to be
widely exploited.'6 Its mineral deposits include gold, silver, zinc,
copper, iron ore, lead, and gypsum.'7 Of these, only gold has been
10. See generally Memorandum of the President of the International
Development Association and the International Finance Corporation to the
Executive Directors on a Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group
for the Republic of Nicaragua, Mar. 18, 1998, WORLD BANK DOCUMENT, REPORT
No. 17496 [hereinafter WORLD BANK].
11. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 1, at 4.
12. See Countty Profile: Nicaragua 1998/1999, TuiE ECONOMIST
INTELLIGENCE UNIT LIMITED, available at 1998 WL 19899411 [hereinafter Coun-
tiy Profile: Nicaragua]. One assessment put Nicaragua's annual growth rate at
seven percent in recent years. See Larry Rohter, Now Ruined Economies Afflict
CentralAmerica, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1998, at A12.
13. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 1, at 5; Latin American Economvs
Growth Will Fall in 1999, ECLAC Says, EFE NEWS SERV., Aug. 4, 1999, available
in WL 8/4/99 EFENEWSERV.
14. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 1, at 5.
15. For the purposes of this article, the term "Latin America" refers to North,
South, and Central American nations (including the Caribbean islands), whose in-
habitants speak a Romance language, such as French, Spanish, or Portuguese. See
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 1.
16. See id. (indicating a good investment climate for the energy, mining, tour-




mined extensively because of a lack of financing."
In addition, Nicaragua is forested with vast expanses of virgin
hardwoods and softwoods, and food fishes abound in its coastal wa-
ters.' 9 At present, the economy is basically agricultural.:" During the
mid-1990s, Nicaragua's main exports were beef, coffee, seafood, and
sugar.1 Industry is reportedly in "an incipient stage of development,"
and is based primarily on the production of consumer goods, such as
alcoholic beverages, cement, footwear, matches, petroleum, textiles,
and vegetable oils.2- In addition, prospective investors will be pleased
to learn that Nicaragua has significant hydroelectric resources.' Ac-
cording to a 1998/1999 report by The Economist Intelligence Unit
Limited, Nicaragua's government is "eager to turn the country into a
free-trade zone for maquila (offshore assembly for re-export) opera-
tions and a grain exporter to the rest of Central America."2'
Part I of this article examines foreign direct investment ("FDI") in
Latin America generally.5 Part II addresses the question of whether
Latin American economic recovery is doomed to fail in view of the
egregious gap between the region's rich and poor, and prospective
foreign investors' reluctance to invest in Nicaragua. Part III discusses
the economic reform policies of the current Nicaraguan government.
In essence, the Aleman administration in Nicaragua recognizes that
FDI has a vital role to play in its development plans, and has made
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id. (noting the agricultural sector constitutes thirty-five percent of Nica-
ragua's GDP and the bulk of its exports).
21. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE. supra note 1.
22. See id.
23. See id. (revealing large amounts of foreign investment in Nicaragua's en-
ergy industry).
24. Countr' Profile: Nicaragua, supra note 12, at 4.
25. For purposes of this article, the term "foreign direct investment", or "FDI,"
refers to investment that is "made to acquire a lasting interest in an enterprise oper-
ating in an economy other than that of the investor, the investor's purpose being to
have an effective voice in the management of the enterprise." DEANNE JULIUS,
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: THE NEGLECTED TWIN OF TRADE 1 1991) quoted
in Edward A. Fallone, Latin American Laws Regulating Foreign Investment, SBO4
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 323, 323 (1996) (quoting the International Monetary Fund's defini-
tion of"FDI").
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its Decree Law on Foreign Investment a centerpiece of its economic
policy. 26 One of the most volatile issues the Aleman administration
must face is how best to resolve the ongoing controversy over private
property rights that is the legacy of confiscations carried out under
the Sandinistas. Until now, the property question has been a major
factor keeping prospective foreign investors at bay.2 7 Part III there-
fore emphasizes this and other problems that Nicaragua must over-
come in order to win prospective foreign investors' confidence.
Part IV analyzes the economic policies that have failed Latin
America in the past, stressing the possibilities for future success that
the region's democratization has made possible. Part V offers, by
way of background for a better understanding of current develop-
ments, a brief history of modem Nicaragua, focusing on Nicaragua's
relationship with the United States, and highlighting the following
eras: the Somoza dictatorship, which lasted from 1937 to 1979; the
Sandinista regime of 1979 to 1990; and the Chamorro presidency of
1991 to 1996, which preceded the Aleman administration."
Part VI discusses Nicaragua's chances for economic success and
lasting democracy, given the country's current political situation.
Part VII examines the role the United States and the rest of the world
has played in the recent past and can play in the future to help Nica-
ragua achieve prosperity, including the provision of humanitarian as-
sistance in the wake of 1998's hurricane damage, debt relief, and ad-
vantageous trade arrangements. The article concludes by making the
case for renewed confidence in, and support for, modem Nicaragua
and the policies of its current government.
26. Ministry of Economy and Development, Rep. Of Nicar., LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENTS, LAW No. 27, at Art. I (establishing the duties, rights, conditions,
benefits and guarantees to which foreign investment will be subjected in
Nicaragua, so as to protect Nicaraguan sovereignty, and to promote economic and
social development) (on file with American Universit, International Law Review).
(hereinafter LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS).
27. See Steve Fainaru, Rightist on Way to Victoiy in Nicaraguan Elections,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 22, 1996, at Al, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, Major
Newspapers File. (concluding the new government must implement policies to
resolve these land disputes for there to be a conducive investment climate).
28. AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF NICARAGUA, DOING BUSINESS IN
NICARAGUA 69 (Price Waterhouse et al. eds., 1998) (on file with the author)
[hereinafter DOING BUSINESS IN NICARAGUA].
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II. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) IN
LATIN AMERICA
A. NEW OPPORTUNITIES
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment ("UNCTAD"), FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean rose
to $97 billion in 1999, a thirty-two percent increase over the previous
year.29 By comparison, Asia attracted $84 billion in FDI over the
same period, making 1999 the first year since 1986 that FDI in Latin
America surpassed Asia's FDI total. " Much of this foreign invest-
ment capital has flowed into Latin American minerals projects, pub-
lic utilities, and manufacturing ventures." But service industries,
such as air transport, commercial and investment banking, and tele-
communications have also attracted FDI, as have other specialized
fields. 2
Anxious to exploit new opportunities, the European Union (EU),
Latin America's largest aid donor," now emphasizes trade with Latin
29. See Matt Moffett, Latin America Tops A.sia in Luring Foreign Investors,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2000, at A2 1.
30. See id.
31. See William Glade, Current Trends and Problems in Foreign Investment in
Latin America, available in WESTLAW. JLR Database, 4-SPG NAFTA: L. &
Bus. Rev. Am. 57, *60 (Spring 1998), available at WL 4-SPR NAFTALBRA 57
(finding that the current investment builds on prior accomplishments because these
sectors customarily received FDI in the past).
32. Glade notes the following:
Lincoln National/Lincoln Life's purchase of a 491o share of Seguros Serfin of
Mexico, for instance, is but one of a new wave of acquisitions by foreign
companies in the insurance markets of Latin America. In Monterey, Mexico,
both Carrefour of France and H.E. Butt of the United States inaugurated mod-
ernized supermarkets to penetrate the Mexican market. In 1997, CBS Tele-
noticias, the world's largest pan-regional Spanish language news network,
signed an agreement with the second largest Brazilian television network, the
Sistema Brasileira de Televisa, to share news gathering and production re-
sources. Nasdaq and Sun Microsystems bought a two-thirds interest in the
Chilean electronic stock exchange. More examples... support... the con-
tention that this investment represents a major amplification and elaboration
of the region's business structure, i.e., its organizational capital.
See, e.g., id.
33. Reviving the European Connection, ECONOMIST. Jun. 26, 1999, at 37-38
2001]
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America. The EU is challenging American companies for dominance
in the region.34 According to one report, 1998 was the first year in
which the flow of investment from Europe to Latin America sur-
passed that from the United States.i 5 European investors have been
led by Spanish companies, prompting some analysts to dub the trend
the "reconquista," or reconquest, of Latin America by Spain. ' In
1998, United States investments in Latin America totaled roughly
$14.3 billion, compared with Spanish investments of some $11.3
billion.37 During 1999, however, Spanish investments in Latin
America rose to almost $20 billion.8
So far, the EU has not been able to negotiate a free-trade agree-
ment with Mercusor, a Spanish acronym for "market of the south," '
which comprises South America's main trading bloc (Argentina,
(discussing the changing relationship between the EU and Latin American na-
tions).
34. See Moffett, supra note 29 (reporting that the UN Economic Commission
for Latin America and the Caribbean identified this change in a recently released
study).
35. See id.
36. Anthony Faiola, Spanish Firms Revive Latin America Conquest, WASH.
POST, Feb. 14, 2000, at Al.
37. See id.
38. See id. In Chile, Spanish firms have acquired the largest waterworks,
telephone, and power companies, and Spanish banks have gained control of 40
percent of the Chilean market. See id. His national pride wounded, one Chilean
told a reporter, "Every time I turn on the lights, make a phone call, cash a check or
drink a glass of water, I'm putting money into pockets in Madrid." Id. He
complained, "It's as if we're a colony again, paying taxes to the Spanish crown."
Id.
Elsewhere, Spanish oil giant Repsol SA in 1998 acquired Argentina's leading oil
company, YPF SA, for $17 billion. See id. The Repsol-YPF SA deal that year
helped boost FDI in Argentina from $6 billion to $25 billion. See id. When Brazil
privatized its national telephone monopoly in 1998, Spain's Telefonia de Espana
bought Telsep, Sao Paulo's local telephone company. See id. By one estimate, Sao
Paulo's population of eleven million makes it the third-largest city in the world.
See id. See also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTES: BRAZIL, MARCH
1998, at 1 [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (BRAZIL)]. According to one report,
Telefonia de Espana now operates a quarter of all Latin American phone lines. See
Faiola, supra note 36.
39. See Mark B. Baker, Integration of the Americas: A Latin Renaissance or a
Prescription for Disaster?, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 309, 319 (1997) (dis-
cussing four approaches to economic integration in Latin America).
[ 16:743
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Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and associate members Bolivia and
Chile).40 For the EU, the possibility of an accord with Mercusor holds
obvious appeal. "If Mercusor were a single country, it would be the
world's second in land mass with 7 million square miles, fourth in
population with 190 million people, and seventh in gross domestic
product ("GDP") with $746 billion."4 ' In short, Mercusor represents
an enormous potential market for EU goods and services.4 : Accord-
ing to one report, "spurts of higher growth and the modemisation of
much local industry have made the [Latin American] region a fast-
growing market for such European products as machine-tools, and
one that has not slowed as much as East Asia.""' Evidently, however,
some EU members fear export competition from Mercusor's agri-
cultural businesses." Even though the EU has become Mercusor's
largest trading partner and greatest source of FDI, trade with Latin
America accounted for only about six percent of the EU's total for-
eign trade during 1999.
45
The United States, for its part, has launched a major initiative to
bolster trade and strengthen relations with Latin American and other
developing nations. On May 18, 2000, President Bill Clinton signed
into law the Trade and Development Act of 2000, a legislative pack-
age that contains the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act ("AGOA")
and the U.S.-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act ("CBTPA").Y'
Recognizing that the countries of the Caribbean Basin form "an in-
creasingly important export market for our [U.S.] goods," the
40. See Larry Rohter, Latin America and Europe To Talk Trade, N.Y. TIMES,
Jun. 26, 1999, at C2 (previewing the Latin American-European Summit where ne-
gotiations for a free-trade agreement will take place), see also Reviving the Euro-
pean Connection, supra note 33, at 37 (discussing the possibilities and reservations
about establishing a trade agreement between Europe and Latin America during
the Summit in Rio de Janeiro).
41. Baker, supra note 39.
42. See Rohter, supra note 40 (discussing the importance of Mercusor's role in
expanding EU trade as a "'counterweight to American global economic domi-
nance").
43. Reviving the European Connection, supra note 33, at 37.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See Trade and Development Act of 2000, 100 Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114
Stat. 251 (2000) [hereinafter Trade and Development Act].
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CBTPA is designed to put beneficiary nations, including designated
Latin American states, on a competitive par with Mexico, which en-
joys preferential trade status with the United States by virtue of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Among other
things, the CBTPA reduces or eliminates duties and quotas on certain
textiles imported into the United States from beneficiary nations. It
also grants temporary trade benefits to countries that, like Nicaragua,
were ravaged by hurricanes Mitch and George in 1998.41
In the meantime, American companies have not conceded Latin
American markets to their European competitors without a fight.
Between 1988 and 1994, for example, the amount invested by
American companies in Latin America rose from $2 billion to $12
billion annually.49 Today, prominent firms in the United States are
actively "developing a web of holdings throughout the region, treat-
ing it like a single, integrated market."50 Efforts to make Latin
America's market integration a de jure reality are ongoing. At the
December 1994 Summit of the Americas, held in Miami, Florida, the
thirty-four heads of state of the Latin American democracies initiated
a formal negotiation process aimed at completing a "Free Trade Area
of the Americas" (FTAA) agreement by 2005."
Brazil is currently regarded as Latin America's "biggest prize" by
foreign investors." For example, a 1999 survey of U.S. companies
47. White House Fact Sheet: Details of the Trade and Development Act of
2000, U.S. NEWSWIRE, May 18, 2000, available at 2000 WL 21166388 (noting the
reasons for the United States strengthening ties to the Caribbean and providing an
overview of the stipulations of the CBTPA).
48. See id. (describing the four policies under the CBTPA that expand prefer-
ential tariff treatment for and eliminate quantitative restrictions for textile, apparel,
and handicraft products).
49. See Fallone, supra note 25, at 323.
50. Id. These companies include Duke Energy Corporation, a global energy
conglomerate based in Charlotte, North Carolina; McDonald's Corporation, the
world's largest restaurant chain, based in Oak Brook, Illinois; and Public Service
Enterprise Group, Inc., an energy generation and distribution firm based in New-
ark, New Jersey. See id.
51. See Free Trade Zone of the Americas, Overview: Chronology of the FTAA
Process, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/view-e.asp; see also Reviving the
European Connection, supra note 33, at 37.
52. Moffett, supra note 29.
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showed Brazil to be their "preferred foreign destination for new in-
vestment."" The reason-with a GDP in excess of S800 billion in
1997, Brazil's 160 million people constitute the region's largest
economy.M By comparison, Argentina (pop. 35.8 million), Latin
America's second largest economy, was less than half that size, with
a 1997 GDP of about $323 billion." Nevertheless, Argentina, along
with countries like Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, experienced increased
FDI during 1999." Mexico, for its part, realized a large increase in
FDI from the United States due to the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA).
5 7
B. Is LATIN AMERICA DOOMED TO FAIL'?
1. The distance between the rich and the poor
Can lasting peace and prosperity be achieved in a region where
economic performance has been mixed, and where there is such a
wide gap between rich and poor? Some observers question whether
Latin America is doomed to fail. For example, Peter Hakim asserted
that not all the region's economies flourished during the 1990s.4' On
the one hand, the Argentine, Chilean, and Peruvian economies grew
at an annual rate of roughly five percent throughout the decade.' The
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Panama did nearly as well."'
On the other hand, according to Hakim, countries like Colombia, Ec-
53. Id.
54. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (BRAZIL), supra note 38, at 1, 2.
55. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTES: ARGENTINA, JANUARY
1999, at 1, 2, available at http://www.state.govwww backgroundnotes
/argentina_01 99_bgn.html.
56. See Moffett, supra note 29.
57. Id.
58. See generally Peter Hakim, Is Latin America Doomed to Failure?, 117
FOREIGN POL'Y 104 (Winter 1999-2000). Hakim is president of The Inter-
American Dialogue, a center for policy analysis based in Washington, D.C. See
Inter-American Dialogue (last modified Nov. 2, 2000), at
http://-vww.iadialog.org/main.html.
59. See Hakim, supra note 58 (noting that Chile was the only country to ap-
proach the economic success of the "Asian tigers").
60. See id. (indicating that despite Latin America's economic restructunng and
policy reforms, most countries fall short of economic expectations).
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uador, Paraguay, and Venezuela lost or failed to gain ground.6 ' Per
capita income in each of these countries will in the year 2000 "be
almost the same as it was 10 years earlier."62 Hakim contends that the
1990s represented the second consecutive decade during which the
region's GDP growth per capita was less than 1.5 percent, "leaving
most Latin Americans almost as poor in 2000 as they were in
1980.,
,63
Meanwhile, according to Hakim, "inequalities of income and
wealth are worsening almost everywhere" in the region." He asserts:
Latin America suffers the worst income disparities of any region in the
world (with sub-Saharan Africa running a close second). Today, more
than half of Latin America's national income goes to one seventh of the
population. Per capita income among the richest 20 percent of Latin
Americans is nearly 12 times that of the poorest 20 percent. In East Asia
and the Middle East, that ratio is less than seven; in South Asia, it is about
four and a half.
6
1
These income disparities are especially disheartening coming as
they do "at a time when the triumph of democracy and open markets
was supposed to usher in a new age of freedom and opportunity.""
Instead, democracy and free trade have been accused of having the
opposite effect. The problem may be one of perception. Since World
War II, progress toward democratization and free trade have given
61. See id. (contrasting the hopes of Latin American officials with the actual
failure of countries to gain economic growth).
62. Id. at 106.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Hakim, supra note 58. For additional statistics concerning the income
gap in Latin America, see e.g., Nancy Birdsall, Life is Unfair: Inequalitv in the
World, 111 FOREIGN POL'Y 76, 78 (Summer 1998):
In Latin America, the ratio of income of the top 20 percent of earners to the
bottom is about 16 to I (almost 25 to 1 in Brazil, probably the world's most
unequal country, compared with about 10 to 1 in the United States and about
5 to I in Western Europe). The wage gap between the skilled and the un-
skilled increased in this decade [i.e., the 1990s] by more than 30 percent in
Peru, 20 percent in Colombia, and nearly 25 percent in Mexico. Ironically,
these were the countries with the greatest wage increases.
66. See Birdsall, supra note 65, at 77 (comparing the income disparities in the
United States, Latin America, Europe and Asia).
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rise to what one observer calls "the expectation of 'convergence'-
that those now lagging behind, whether nations or groups within na-
tions, will inevitably catch up."' " But the gap between rich and poor,
within nations as well as between and among them, appears to be
widening. Even in the United States, the situation is disquieting. For
instance, as Nancy Birdsall, executive vice-president of the Inter-
American Development Bank, maintains:
Income inequality in the United States is increasing, not only because of
gains at the top, but more disturbingly, because of losses at the bot-
tom .... The average wage of white male high-school graduates fell 15
percent from 1973 to 1993, and the number of men aged 25 to 54 years
earning less than S10,000 a year grew. Possibly for the first time in the
nation's history, educational gains may be reinforcing rather than offset-
ting income inequality: High education has become a prerequisite for
economic success, but because access to it depends on family income, the
poor are at a distinct disadvantage .... The situation is less clear but no
more heartening in other parts of the world."
According to Birdsall, wealth disparities are the result of many
factors, some of them historical. Citing Latin America as an exam-
ple, she observes:
Inequality begets inequality. Therefore, history matters. Consider Latin
America. The combination of mineral wealth, soils and climate suitable
for sugar production, and imported slave labor, or conquered indigenous
labor, helped produce two castes: large landowners and politically un-
armed workers. In 1950, just 1.5 percent of farm owners in Latin America
accounted for 65 percent of all agricultural land; unequal land distribu-
tion, then the highest in the world, has risen since. Wealth in natural re-
sources invited concentration of income. History and politics subse-
quently conspired to produce economic and institutional arrangements
that have perpetuated that concentration.(
Other reasons for the increases in income disparity, in Birdsall's
view, include racial or ethnic discrimination in the job market; gov-
67. Id.
68. Id. But see William Julius Wilson, Editorial, .4I11 Boats Rise. ,Vow What?,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2000, at A31 (crediting the economic boom with diminishing
America's income equality that has been prevalent since the 1970s).
69. Birdsall, supra note 65, at 80.
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ernment policies that undermine economic growth or fuel inflation;
and a lack of education among the poor.70 Birdsall emphasizes the
need for education, stating, "Failure to invest in the education and
skills of the poor is a fundamental cause of inequality. 7' Higher
spending on education is, in fact, characteristic of those few coun-
tries that have been able to maintain high economic growth with low
inequality in the postwar period 2
Birdsall also cites poor countries' weak infrastructures and unreli-
able judicial and regulatory regimes,73 as well as disadvantageous
"rational decisions" made by poor people, as factors that exacerbate
the income gap. 4 For example, wealthy, educated people tend to
marry each other, which concentrates their families' wealth.7 5 By
contrast, poor, uneducated people marry others who are similarly
situated, thereby perpetuating their poverty.76 Poor families also have
more children than their wealthy, better-educated counterparts,
leaving them with less to spend per child for nutrition, health, and
education.
77
2. How free trade helps
What can be done to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor?
Evidence suggests that liberalized trade and global integration foster
economic growth, which shrinks the gap." In regard to trade, Birdsall
70. See id. (analyzing the various reasons for increases in global income dis-
parity, with an emphasis on practices that perpetuate a cycle of poverty among the
neediest families).
71. See id. at 83-84.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 86, critiquing advocates of a global New Deal).
74. See Birdsall, supra note 65, at 80.
75. See id. (explaining that in the 1970s in Brazil, the scarcity of university
graduates caused their salaries to rise, thus worsening inequality).
76. See id. (suggesting that predictable human behavior, such as marriage pat-
terns, often fosters income disparity).
77. See id. at 82 (discussing that overpopulation of the poor leads to unem-
ployment and low wages, which perpetuate problems of inequality).
78. See id. at 85 (suggesting two reasons that trade and economic integration
reduce inequality); see also Wilson, supra note 68 (reporting that diminished in-
come inequality in the United States may not bring as much progress as seen in the
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has noted that "[d]eveloping countries that have been most open to
trade have had the fastest growth, reducing global inequality; those
least integrated into global markets, such as many African econo-
mies, have remained among the world's poorest." " The reasons why
free trade reduces the income gap may be two-fold. First, prices drop
when barriers to cheap imports fall, benefiting poorer consumers.
Second, free trade undermines the unfair advantages used by mo-
nopolistic players to inflate prices in domestic markets." Again, the
poor benefit from the resulting lower prices.
In regard to global integration, a process in which FDI plays a
fundamental role, one commentator has observed:
Despite the conflicting interests of multi-national enterprises ("MNEs")
and host countries, MNE investment can deliver benefits to the host de-
veloping country, although potential benefits depend, in part, on the na-
ture of the FDI undertaken and the economic condition of the country.
Host country benefits may include: the injection of needed capital; the in-
troduction, transfer, or spillover of technology; the introduction of so-
phisticated management skills; increased host country employment; in-
creased competition in the host country market; increased foreign
exchange earnings through MNE exports; and other benefits z
FDI has potential pitfalls, however, which should not be under-
stated. For example, MNEs can repatriate their profits in a way that
depletes a host country's foreign reserves." Also, MNEs can engage
in a host of restrictive business practices that reduce their overall
contribution to the local economy. These include the imposition of
restrictions on subsidiary licensing of technology, and complex
past).
79. See Birdsall, supra note 65, at 84.
80. See id. at 86 (explaining that prices fall because of enhanced price compe-
tition and these lower prices benefit the poor because they use most of their income
for consumption).
81. See id. (stating that the economic privileges and monopolies of wealth.
symbolic and supportive of high inequality, are challenged by open markets and
free trade).
82. Eric M. Burt, Note, Developing Countries and the Framework fbr Negotia-
tions on Foreign Direct Investment in the World Trade Organization, 12 AM. U.J.
INT'L. L. & POL'Y 1015, 1021 (1997).
83. See id. at 1022 (describing the potential costs of MNE investment).
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transfer pricing arrangements that reduce local taxes or limit host
countries' export revenues.84 In addition, MNEs can engage in prac-
tices that are harmful or destructive to the host country's natural re-
sources or the environment. "
Moreover, privatization of state-run companies can, in the short-
run at least, increase domestic unemployment. 6 And if corruption
accompanies the privatization process, insiders can reap ill-begotten
windfalls.87 Meanwhile, competition from foreign companies can
drive inefficient, formerly protected domestic industries out of busi-
ness, further adding to unemployment. "' Nevertheless, "[m]ost devel-
oping countries today subscribe to the view that in spite of potential
negative effects of FDI on host country economies, the potential
economic benefits of FDI render the investment desirable as long as
the potential FDI costs are controlled and the FDI is 'properly har-
nessed.'"8 9
3. Emerging from the "intellectual ghettos of Third Worldism"
Latin America's receptivity to FDI represents a break with its past.
To one observer, it symbolizes nothing less than the "general emer-
gence of Latin American policymakers from the intellectual ghettos
of Third Worldism . . ... " Historically, Latin American countries
adopted laws restricting FDI, fearing "the influence of foreign in-
vestors, the loss of their sovereignty, and the rape of their natural re-
sources." 9' After the debt crisis of the 1980s, however, when foreign
banks were no longer willing or able to finance Latin American de-
velopment, the region's leaders turned to FDI as "an efficient means
to fund economic growth, promote the influx of new technology, and
84. See id. at 1022-23.
85. See id. at 1022.
86. See Birdsall, supra note 65, at 82 (commenting on the effects of market re-
forms in contributing to inequality).
87. See id. at 83 (illustrating Russia as an example in support of this argument).
88. See id. (realizing how open trade could lead to wage reductions or unem-
ployment for workers because the inefficiencies will be exposed when the compa-
nies are privatized or must compete with foreign counterparts).
89. Burt, supra note 82, at 1023.
90. Glade, supra note 31, at 61.
91. Fallone, supra note 25, at 327.
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increase the labor and managerial skills of the local labor pool.":
Regulatory reforms favorable to FDI were also inspired by the desire
to privatize inefficient state-run enterprises." Typically, a govern-
ment that privatizes its state industries by selling or auctioning inter-
ests in them to the private sector does so in order to "increase the ef-
ficiency of its operations, develop local capital markets, raise capital
from foreign sources for expansion and modernization, and promote
the importation of new technology and new management tech-
niques. ' 9 Whatever the symbolism and motives, the changed per-
spective toward FDI certainly helps to explain why Latin America
has become "a major recipient of foreign direct investment in a
growing variety of fields."' 5
C. RELUCTANCE TO INVEST IN NICARAGUA
1. Nicaragua is desperately poor
Foreign investors have, however, been more reluctant to invest in
Nicaragua than in other Latin American countries. " For example, in
1997 private foreign capital investment in Nicaragua was a meager
$113 million, and only twenty-five American companies were doing
business there.97 The lack of FDI may be attributable to Nicaragua's
harsh economic circumstances and prospective foreign investors'
fears about its "weak government, corruption, poor markets and mas-
sive problems with obtaining legal property titles."''
Consider the negatives. Nicaragua is desperately poor: approxi-
mately seventy percent of its people live in poverty; half the
workforce is unemployed; and annual per capita income is only
92. Id.
93. See id. (describing the origin of many of the Nicaraguan regulatory re-
foms).
94. Id.
95. Glade, supra note 31, at 60.
96. See Molly Moore, For Nicaraguans, Promises L nkept: 20 vears ..Ifter
Sandinista Coup, Poverty Prevails, WASH. POST. Jul. 19, 1999, at A13 (suggesting
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around $435.99 In addition, Nicaragua remains a debtor nation despite
the significant reduction in its foreign debt. By one estimate, the
government spends eleven times more each year on debt service than
on health care.' ° Nicaragua is also heavily dependent on foreign aid.
By one assessment, foreign grants in 1997 "provided public finances
equivalent to 17.6 percent of government revenue."' '
An even more telling measure of Nicaragua's plight may be its
low ranking on the human development index ("HDI"), used by the
United Nations Development Program ("UNDP") to gauge quality of
life. Applying the HDI's three-pronged indicia-life expectancy,
educational attainment, and income-in 1999, Nicaragua ranked
121st out of 174 countries with high, medium, and low human de-
velopment.' °2 As a region, Latin America ranked third on the HDI in-
dex, lagging behind the industrialized countries, Eastern Europe, and
the former Soviet Union, but ahead of parts of South and Southeast
Asia, parts of East Asia, the Arab states, and Sub-Saharan Africa.""
Ironically, Nicaragua's position marked an improvement of five
spots up from its 126th ranking the previous year.'04
2. Lack of confidence in Nicaragua's courts
Nicaraguan laws subject foreign investors to jurisdiction in their
courts. Such investors find this troublesome because Nicaragua's le-
gal framework is weak. They are uncomfortable with a system in
which the enforcement of contracts and property rights needs en-
99. See id.
100. See Editorial, Peace and Poverty in Central America, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
1999, at A ll (reporting that although the civil conflicts in Latin America have sub-
sided, these countries still suffer from poverty and inequality).
101. See Countly Profile: Nicaragua, supra note 12.
102. See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
RJEPORT 1999, at 136 (stating Nicaragua climbed five places on the Human Devel-
opment Index ("HDI") from 126th in 1998 to 121st in 1999) [hereinafter UNITED
NATIONS]; Nicaragua Press Highlights 19 July, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, July
19, 1999, available at 1999 WL 21973122 (discussing the rank of Nicaragua on
the HDI, which has been the lowest of all Central American countries since 1996)
[hereinafter Nicaragua Press Highlights].
103. See UNITED NATIONS, supra note 102, at 137.
104. See id. at 136; Nicaragua Press Highlights, supra note 102.
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hancement.' ° Yet the Decree Law on Foreign Investment ("DLFI")
provides that foreign investors shall be entirely subject to the laws
and courts of Nicaragua, just as citizens are.""' In the event of a dis-
pute between Nicaragua and a foreign investor as to the interpreta-
tion of an investment contract, Article 53 of the DLFI provides for
arbitration in accordance with procedures stipulated in the contract,
once negotiation and conciliation efforts are exhausted."" If, how-
ever, the nature of the controversy has not been included in the con-
tract's arbitration clause, the dispute will be subjected to the juris-
diction of ordinary Nicaraguan courts. Unfortunately, by the
Nicaraguan government's own assessment, potential investors con-
sistently cite "[l]ack of confidence in the judicial system" as a deter-
rent to investment.108
Contributing to this lack of confidence is that Nicaragua has a
civil, rather than a common, law system. Civil law has its roots in
ancient Roman law, where judges were typically lay figures."" One
of the major differences between common law and civil law jurisdic-
tions is that legislative codes in common law countries are less or-
ganic, systemic, and thorough than civil law states."' In a common
law state, a lawyer normally must look to case law for interpretive
analysis or precedent as to the meaning of a statute or regulations,
whereas in a civil law country, the legislative code purports to be
105. See WORLD BANK, supra note 10, Private Sector Strategy, at para. 2.
106. See LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS, supra note 26, ch. 5, art. 30. See also
By-Laws for the Foreign Investment Law, Decree Number 30-92, Ministry of
Economy and Development, Republic of Nicaragua, ch. 5, art. 52 (1991) (Nic.)
[hereinafter By-Law No. 30-92]. Chapter 5, Article 52 of the DLFI states that
"[floreign investors will, by all, be subjected to the laws and courts of Nicaragua,
the same way as Nicaraguan citizens are, except in those aspects to which they
have been granted rights and guarantees according to the Law and these By-Laws."
See id.
107. See id. at art. 53.
108. See WORLD BANK, supra note 10, Private Sector Strategy, at para. 2.
109. See Jose A. Santos, Civil Law Comparisons, Proceedings of the Ninth
Annual Cotference on Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Latin America: NVew
Approaches-Looking to the Twenty-First Centur-v. II FLA. J. INT'L L. 1, 71
(1996) (explaining the history and differences between common law and civil law
systems).
110. See id. at 70 (citing the United States as an example of a common law
country).
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wholly self-contained and self-explanatory." ' Judicial decisions are
not viewed as a source of law in civil law jurisdictions, and there is
no concept of stare decisis, as judges are not expected to follow
precedent." 2 Furthermore, it would be regarded as improper for Nica-
raguan judges to make law, because little deference is given to
judges or to judicial decisions."3
Another major difference between common law and civil law
countries is that the rules of evidence in civil law states are not as
strict as they tend to be in common law jurisdictions."4 During a trial,
evidence is presented as it arises, and trials usually tend to last much
longer."15 Also, while it is difficult to get an appellate court to over-
turn a decision in a common law country, trials tend to be de novo on
appeal in civil law states, which slows the adjudicative process."'
Despite these and other drawbacks, Nicaragua welcomes FDI as a
vital component of the development of its economy. To appreciate
how significant this is, one must first understand the degree to which
current policies favorable to FDI represent a break with the thinking
and failed economic policies of the past throughout Latin America,
in general, and Nicaragua in particular.
III. REFORMS UNDERTAKEN BY NICARAGUA
A. FREE TRADE AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
Throughout the 1990s, successive Nicaraguan governments tried
to move the economy forward by making trade liberalization and re-
gional economic integration cornerstones of economic policy."7
11. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 71 (comparing the role of judges in common law versus civil law
countries).
114. See Santos, supra note 109, at 72 (stating the lack of knowledge relating to
rules of evidence in civil law states).
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See Country Profile: Nicaragua, supra note 12 (discussing Nicaragua's
economic strategy in the 1990s).
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Nicaragua committed itself to having an open economy by reducing
or eliminating trade barriers and state trading activities."' The goal
was to increase foreign currency earnings, reduce the national debt,
and attract industrial development."' Nicaragua currently maintains
trade relations with all countries of the world, regardless of their po-
litical systems.'20 Nicaragua has joined several free trade regimes, in-
cluding the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), of
which it has been a member since 1949; the Central American
Common Market ("CACM"); the Caribbean Basin Initiative
("CBI"); the Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC"); and
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA"), which in-
sures investors against possible risks.':'
At a ceremony held in Managua on May 2, 2000, Nicaraguan
president Aleman joined El Salvadoran president Francisco Flores
Perez, and Guatemalan president Alfonso Portillo Cabrera, in signing
an agreement aimed at promoting close cooperation in economic and
foreign policy, infrastructure development, and security matters.' - A
joint declaration issued by the three rulers stated, "We hope to set the
foundation for carrying the process of integration, which dates from
the 1960s, into the 21st century."'2 Current plans include expanding
ferry service and shipping along the countries' coasts.2 4
B. ATTRACTING FDI
1. Structural adjustments and reform initiatives
Because the Aleman government is convinced that foreign capital
is essential in order for Nicaragua to develop economically, it has
118. See DOING BUSINESS IN NICARAGUA, supra note 28, at 33.
119. See Countiy Profile: Nicaragua, supra note 12.
120. See DOING BUSINESS IN NICARAGUA, supra note 28, at 31.
121. See id. at 33
122. See Three Central American countries sign integraton accord, ASSOC.
PRESS, May 2, 2000, available in WL 5/2/00 APWIRES 16:02:00 (describing the
meeting between the leaders of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala).
123. See id.
124. See id. (reporting the plans of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala to
expand several transportation services along their coasts).
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endeavored to establish and maintain conditions that are favorable to
FDI.'25 In April 1994, Nicaragua entered into an Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility ("ESAF") agreement with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).'2 6 By the terms of this agreement, Nicaragua
received an IMF loan of $168 million, in exchange for its commit-
ment to free market economic reform. 1 2' Nicaragua signed a second
ESAF agreement with the IMF in March 1998.28 By the terms of this
subsequent agreement, the Aleman administration committed itself to
holding the line on government spending, and reducing the public
sector deficit by 4 percent of GDP in the year 2000.2' In return, the
IMF pledged $1.8 billion to help Nicaragua reach its goals and ob-
jectives by that date. 30
Since entering into the second ESAF agreement, Nicaragua has, in
fact, made notable progress."' For example, the government has im-
plemented policies designed to reduce its large fiscal deficit by cut-
ting income, import and other tax rates in order to spur economic
growth and thereby widen the tax base."' Nicaragua's maximum an-
nual income tax rate of 30 percent is lower than that of many coun-
tries.' Nicaragua scheduled a further reduction, to 25 percent, for
1999.114
As its primary means of promoting FDI, Nicaragua issued its De-
cree Law on Foreign Investment ("DLFI")-Law Number 127, in
125. See DOING BUSINESS IN NICARAGUA, supra note 28, at 28.
126. See County Profile: Nicaragua, supra note 12.
127. See id. (detailing the figures and terms of the agreement between the IMF
and Nicaragua). By signing the ESAF, Nicaragua also promised to cut public ex-
penditures, particularly in defense, public security, and publicly owned enterprises.
See id. This commitment by Nicaragua resulted in the privatization of 340 state
enterprises by the end of 1994. See id.
128. See id. (describing the 1998 ESAF agreement between Nicaragua and the
IMF).
129. See id. (listing the goals of the 1998 ESAF agreement).
130. Inter-American Development Bank, available at http//:www.iadb.org, at I
(on file with author).
13 1. See Country Profile: Nicaragua, supra note 12.





1991.' Nicaragua designed the law to accelerate its economic and
social development within a framework of respect for national sover-
eignty and the legal system.' 6 The decree is fairly liberal to the ex-
tent that any foreign capital introduced into the Nicaraguan economy
will be considered an investment, regardless of the nationality or the
legal residence of the investor."
Chapter Two, Article 7 of the DLFI sets out the Rights and Guar-
antees of the Investor. These include the right to, among other things,
repatriate net foreign capital, remit abroad the net profits generated
by the capital registered, and, perhaps most important to foreign in-
vestors, "rapid, adequate and effective compensation in case of ex-
propriation for reasons of public utility or social interest." " ' The con-
fidence of foreign investors can be won more easily when and if
there is protection against expropriation.'" Thus, Nicaragua has
given foreign investors the comfort of knowing that if they do invest
in Nicaragua, they will be duly compensated if the government con-
fiscates their property.
Prospective foreign investors also should be encouraged by the
fact that in 1998, Nicaragua effectively voided the Law of Agents,
Representatives, and Distributors of Foreign Products, which had
protected local agents and established the exclusiveness of foreign
representation contracts. '4" Now any foreign investment contract
signed after July 1998 will be protected in the same way as any other
investment contract.'4 ' There are also plans for a new hydrocarbons
law that should encourage FDI in the exploration in Nicaragua's
mines. 4
135. See id.
136. LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS. supra note 26, at Arts. 1-30 (listing the
general provisions of the law on foreign investments)
137. See id. at ch. 1, art. 2 (explaining Nicaragua's categorization of foreign
investments).
138. See id. at ch. 2, art. 7.
139. See generally Note, Protection of Foreign Direct Investment in a .en-
World Order: Vietnanm-A Case Stud, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1995 (1994) (detailng
Vietnam's efforts to encourage and protect FDI).
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Meanwhile, the Las Mercedes free-trade zone, located near the
international airport in the Nicaraguan capital of Managua, is ex-
panding quickly. 4 3 Local producers who operate in the zone are 100
percent exempt from income tax during their first decade of opera-
tion. 4' Foreign investors who use the free trade zone are allowed to
sell up to forty percent of their products locally.4 Foreign companies
currently operating within the Las Mercedes zone include Ecco de
Nicaragua of Italy, and Chentex, which is based in Taiwan. "6 Tai-
wanese business leaders have already invested some $30 million in
the free trade zone, and are planning to spend another $100 million
to build a textile plant in Nicaragua that will process 300,000 bales
of cotton annually and employ up to 1,200 workers.
141
2. Fighting poverty
To fight poverty, the government has set out to modernize the ru-
ral sector, encouraging infrastructure investment, establishing credit
funds for farmers, and improving social services. ' Through privati-
zation and modernization of state institutions, the government also
intends to increase public savings and improve the efficiency of the
public sector.' 49 In fact, privatization has proved to be one of the most
effective means of attracting FDI.'"0 As mentioned, at least 351 state-
run enterprises have been privatized since 1991.'5' These include
PETRONIC, a state-owned petroleum products firm privatized in
1996 when a fifty-one percent share of the company was sold to a
foreign investor, and Banco Nicaraguense de Industria y Comercio
("BANIC"), a fifty-one percent share of which was due to go on sale
143. See id. at 36-79.
144. See id. at 77.
145. See DOING BUSINESS IN NICARAGUA, supra note 28, at 30.
146. See id.
147. See Nicaragua-Taiwan: Taiwan Investors to Build Textile Factor)' in Nica-
ragua, EFE NEWS SERV., Feb. 22, 2000, available in WL 2/22/00 EFENEWSERV
[hereinafter Nicaragua- Taiwan].
148. See Inter-American Development Bank, supra note 130, at 2.
149. See id. at 1.
150. See DOING BUSINESS IN NICARAGUA, supra note 28, at 77.




in 1999.112 Thus private investment, from both domestic and foreign
sources, has been rising, with FDI targeted for infrastructure proj-
ects.153
3. Tax relbrm
The government implemented tax reforms aimed at making tax en-
forcement and collection fairer, more efficient, and simpler, as is the
case with the flat land tax." A tariff reform program has also been
adopted.'55 In addition, to encourage FDI, Nicaragua has opened all
commercial activities to foreign investment, now allows 100 percent
foreign ownership, and no longer subjects foreign-source income to
Nicaraguan income tax. ' Moreover, the government has amended
the Tax and Commercial Justice Law in order to provide foreign in-
vestors with favorable tax treatment.' Among other things, foreign
corporations are subject to income tax only on their Nicaraguan-
source income; profits of foreign-domiciled exporters on their ex-
ports to Nicaragua are considered foreign-source income and are not
subject to Nicaraguan income tax; and branches of foreign corpora-




To consolidate democracy, a new electoral law has been passed
and institutions such as the Judiciary, the Comptroller General, and
the Attorney General are being strengthened.'" Furthermore, two
152. See DOING BUSINESS IN NICARAGUA, supra note 28, at 77.
153. See id.
154. See WORLD BANK, supra note 10, at I (discussing Nicaragua's move out of
a transition economy).
155. See id.
156. See DOING BUSINESS IN NICARAGUA, supra note 28. at 36-79.
157. See id. at 27.
158. See id. at 77.
159. See WORLD BANK, supra note 10, at 4 (recognizing the creation of
legislation to establish administrative tribunals, the nomination of a new human
rights Attorney General, and attempts by the government to improve the flow of
information to the public).
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administrative tribunals have been established: one protecting citi-
zens from government abuses, and one consolidating civilian control
over the military.' 6 In an effort to improve communication and the
flow of information to and from the public, the government set up ad
hoc groups to discuss development issues.'
6
5. The property question
Because the Chamorro administration failed to resolve the issue of
property ownership, it remains one of the biggest problems the Ale-
man administration faces. When the Sandinistas were in power, they
nationalized virtually everything, including many private farms, and
they confiscated many private homes. In fact, thirty-five percent of
all Nicaraguan land was transferred into Sandinista hands during the
course of their agrarian reforms.'62 The former property owners are
known as "los confiscados," or "the confiscated ones.' 6 3
Now that the Sandinistas are no longer in power, "los confisca-
dos," 471 of whom are American citizens, want their property
back.' 64 The Aleman administration must now attempt to resolve
what property belongs to whom. In fact, the property question has
been so troublesome that it is having a significant, adverse effect on
FDI.
165
Aleman has said that poor Nicaraguans who were given confis-
cated lands during the Sandinista regime will be given legal title to
those properties. 66 But for that to happen, Daniel Ortega and other
Sandinista leaders who ordered the confiscations will have to com-
160. See id. (describing the important pieces of legislation currently being
considered to establish these tribunals).
161. See id. (listing some of the discussion groups' specific topics such as
bargaining forums and the national dialogue that will be analyzed to broaden
consensus concerning development issues).
162. See Fainaru, supra note 27, at Al (noting that this land transfer is in excess
of $1 billion worth of property in a nation with an annual GDP of $2 billion).
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id. One Pizza Hut franchise had to search all over Managua to find




pensate the previous owners at full market value."" Otherwise, the
seized estates will revert to their original, rightful owners."
Many say that because resolving the issue of property rights is key
to attracting FDI, it could be one of the most vital issues the Aleman
administration will have to solve. " ' In fact, former United States Sec-
retary of State James Baker has been quoted as saying that "the in-
vestment community is going to take one more look at Nicara-
gua...If they don't have policies in place by then or at least don't
show that they are creating an environment for investment, they're
going to go somewhere else."'1" As it turns out, by the end of his first
year in power, Aleman and his administration had begun negotiations
with the opposition, and had begun devising a new property law.'
The law recognizes the rights of smallholders, defines dispute reso-
lution procedures for larger properties, and creates special courts to
address pending cases."2 The government also plans on delivering
90,000 property titles to small urban and rural plot holders in the
next few years, and to create the institutional infrastructure needed
for real estate markets to operate efficiently."
6. Nicaragua 's debt
Nicaragua's external debt has been reduced but still equals an
amount three times greater than its gross domestic product.' Up to
167. See Fainaru, supra note 27, at Al (describing the additional requirements
that President Aleman has placed on former Sandinistas).
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id. (postulating that Nicaragua has a limited amount of time- about
eighteen months - to convince the foreign investment community of its potential
value).
171. See WORLD BANK, supra note 10. at 4 (describing cooperation on the new
property law as a conciliatory act by Aleman and his administration to appease the
opposition).
172. See id. at 8 (stating that these reforms will allo%% resolution of pending
claims and hasten the delivery of property titles). Additionally, the government is
seeking donor support for a judicial reform that plans to improve legal procedures
and enhance enforcement of contracts and property rights. See tul
173. See id.
174. See id. at 5.
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now, Nicaragua's economy has functioned as well as it has because
of the influx of foreign aid Nicaragua has received.'7 But government
expenditures surpass an amount roughly equal to forty percent of
Nicaragua's gross domestic product, and productivity is low.' 76 Thus,
Nicaragua's future depends greatly on whether or not it can
strengthen its external position.
77
The current debt crisis began under the Sandinistas. According to
the Oxfam International Advocacy Office in Washington, D.C. ("Ox-
fam"), whatever beneficial reforms the Sandinistas brought were
paid for largely with borrowed money. An October 1998 Oxfam po-
sition paper entitled Debt Relieffor Nicaragua: Breaking Out of the
Poverty Trap, described how the debt crisis came about:
Nicaragua's debt problems intensified during the 1980s. As in other
heavily indebted and poor countries, external problems such as falling
commodity prices, rising oil prices, and high interest rates interacted with
economic mismanagement and excessive borrowing. Nicaragua's situa-
tion was worsened by armed conflict in large parts of the country.
In 1979 the revolutionary Sandinista government inherited from the So-
moza regime US$1.6 billion of debt, low national savings, and a country
debilitated by years of civil war. During the 11 years of Sandinista rule,
significant advances were made in meeting the basic needs of the popula-
tion, and in rapidly raising health and education standards. Ultimately,
however, these policies were financed through increased borrowing,
which led to an expanding and unsustainable public sector and serious
indebtedness. The exchange rate was overvalued, and inflation rose, to
reach 36,000 percent in 1988. The government faced serious balance of
payments problems and rising debt. These difficulties were further com-
pounded by the US-led economic embargo and international isolation, and
the US-supported war of the 1980s. This war was both costly and de-
structive, and lead to greatly increased defense expenditure. The govern-
ment initially responded to these external and internal problems by dis-
continuing debt service, assuming a massive debt with the USSR, and
increasing money supply. The situation worsened, and the Sandinista
government eventually introduced a stabilisation package which included
devaluation, increases in interest rates, and restrictions on credit and pub-
lic spending. The recession caused GDP to decline by 13 percent and
175. See id. (reporting that foreign aid supports about one-fifth of Nicaragua's
GDP).
176. See id.
177. See WORLD BANK, supra note 10, at 4.
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further undermined worsening social indicators.
In 1990, the new Chamorro government inherited a debt stock of SUS 10.7
billion, 40 per cent of which was arrears. By 1994, this debt had reached a
peak of USS 11.7 billion. Nicaragua at that time had the highest debt per
capita and highest ratio of debt to GDP ofany countr in the iworhl."
Nicaragua's debt is one of the major obstacles to the country's de-
velopment, but with good performance under the ESAF arrange-
ments with the IMF, Nicaragua hopes to become eligible for the
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, which could al-
low it to reduce its external debt burden to sustainable levels.'' Un-
der the HIPC framework that was originally adopted by the IMF and
World Bank in 1996, poor nations that find themselves in unsustain-
able debt situations may apply to their creditor nations and multilat-
eral institutions like the World Bank for various forms of debt relief,
including debt reduction, or repayment delays."
The problem for Nicaragua in the short-run, unfortunately, is that
despite major reform put in place since the late 1980's, it still has a
"broken track record" with the IMF." ' For example, Nicaragua
failed to meet certain taxation targets established under its April
1994 ESAF agreement."2 Similarly, satisfying a number of the
benchmarks contained in the March 1998 ESAF package will also be
extremely difficult.' Consequently, Nicaragua may not, by one as-
sessment, be eligible for HIPC debt relief until at least 2002." How-
ever, its creditors may, at their discretion, grant some form of debt
relief prior to that date. For example, the leaders of the world's rich-
est democracies, the so-called G-7, meeting for their 25th annual
178. Oxfam International, Debt Relief for Nicaragua: Breaking out of the Pov-
erty Trap, available at http://ww.v.caa.org.au/oxfam/adocacy/debunicaragua
debt.html (emphasis added) [hereinafter Oxfam Debt Relief].
179. See WORLD BANK, supra note 10. at 5.
180. See The HIPC Debt Initiative, The World Bank Group, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/about/hibcbr/hipcbr.htm (describing the H1PC ini-
tiative).
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summit in Cologne, Germany, agreed in June 1999 to forgive
roughly $70 billion worth of debt owed by the poorest nations." At
the time, British Prime Minister Tony Blair called this "the single
biggest step forward in debt relief and help for the poorest nations
that we've seen in the international community for many years. '
For its part, the Paris Club of creditor nations in 1998 suspended
Nicaragua's debt payments for three years in order to help the coun-
try recover from the damage caused by Hurricane Mitch.'8 7 By one
estimation, Hurricane Mitch, which struck in late 1998, was the
worst storm to hit the Central American region in 200 years, devas-
tating the economies of Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala and El Sal-
vador,18 and killing as many as 9,000 people in those countries."
185. See James Gerstenzang, Democracies to Ease Debt for Poor Nations, L.A.
TIMES, June 19, 1999, at Al (describing the G-7 meeting).
186. Id. (describing the importance of the "Cologne initiative").
187. See CNN, Paris Club Suspends Debt for two Mitch-hit countries (Dec. 10,
1998), available at http://oxcamex.org.ni/mitch/English/news/Paris%20Club
%20Suspends%debt%20for%20Mitch%20countries.htm. [hereinafter Paris Club
Suspends Debt] (on file with the American University International Law Review).
For a discussion of the Paris Club, see Paris Club, available at
http://www.bradynet.com/bbs/nonem/1 00000-0.html:
The Paris Club is a forum for 19 creditor countries, which meet in Paris on a
monthly basis to discuss debt issues. Among other things, the Paris Club ad-
dresses the issue of coordinated debt relief for developing countries that can-
not service their debt. The 19 members of the Paris Club are the original
OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] and Rus-
sia .... The Paris Club bases its activities on five main principles:
1. Conditionality: Only countries which implement IMF economic reform
programmes can obtain a new debt relief agreement in the Paris Club. 2. The
Paris Club's decisions are based on a case-by-case assessment of the special
needs of each individual debtor country. 3. Consensus: The Paris Club only
takes decisions on which there is a consensus among all the creditor countries.
4. Comparability of treatment between creditors means that no creditor can
demand larger payments or different, more favorable terms than those decided
jointly in the Club. 5. Creditor solidarity means that no creditor can seek to
obtain more favourable terms than those laid down by the Paris Club agree-
ment.
See also Charlotte Denny and Peter Gaskill, The Paris Club, THE GUARDIAN (Dec.
9, 1998), reprinted at http://www.oxcamex.org.ni/mitchlEnglish/news/ What%20is
%20the%20Paris%20Club.htm (providing a description of the Paris Club).
188. Paris Club Suspends Debt, supra note 187; see also Charles Babington,
Clinton Offers Aid to Nicaragua: President Inaugurates Tour With $120 Million
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The Paris Club has also promised to write off about eighty percent of
the debt Nicaragua owes to its members once Nicaragua qualifies for
assistance under the HIPC initiative. '
Nevertheless, according to the World Bank's Debt Sustainabilit,
Analysis on Nicaragua, its debt situation is going to continue to
make Nicaragua vulnerable over the next decade, even after imple-
mentation of debt relief programs, because of low national income
and Nicaragua's poor export base.' The World Bank emphasizes
that "a sustained improvement in Nicaragua's external debt situation
would require the strict adherence to a strong adjustment program,
eschewing nonconcessional borrowing, and recourse to debt re-
lief."' 92
7. Strengthening the legal and regulatoofranework
Another obstacle to Nicaragua's development is its weak legal
framework. 93 The legal system needs to be strengthened in order to
resolve outstanding claims that date back to the Sandinistas, as well
as to allow for documenting and transforming property rights." As
discussed, the government has already approved a new property law
that allows for the resolution of pending claims which will hopefully
expedite the process of getting property to rightful owners, as well as
launching legal procedures that will enforce contracts and property
rights.' "95 Additional improvements would include a modem commer-
cial code, bankruptcy law, and intellectual property rights, and re-
Pledge for Hurricane Relief WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1999, at A9 (discussing the
damage caused by Hurricane Mitch).
189. See Thomas W. Lippman, 2 Nations Hit Hard bY Mitch Proinnsed AIld: Bil-
lion in Debt Relief New Grants Are Planned, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1998, at Al
(describing the debt relief offered to nations affected by Humcane Mitch).
190. See Paris Club Suspends Debt, supra note 187.
191. See WORLD BANK, supra note 10, Annex D, at 1.
192. See id. (stating that the country's external debt situation remains
vulnerable).
193. See WORLD BANK, supra note 10, at 8.
194. See id.
195. See id. (analyzing the new property law reforms, which the government
believes will generate the institutional infrastructure necessary for an efficient real
estate market).
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vising the foreign investment code, so as to remove any remaining
prejudice against foreign investors. 1
8. Upgrading Nicaragua's infrastructure
Nicaragua's infrastructure is in dire need of repair. Access to tele-
phone services, electricity, good road conditions, and water supply
are below average.' 7 Loss of water and electricity is very common. "'
As one who has visited Nicaragua knows, these problems include
having to keep huge plastic containers in bathrooms in case the water
happens to be shut off while one is showering; a months-long wait
list for home telephone service; power outages that occur several
times a week; and poor road conditions that necessitate 4-wheel drive
vehicles for all who can afford them. The government is in the proc-
ess of improving its roads and water systems through a public in-
vestment program, and continues to encourage investment in indus-
tries, such as telecommunications, making sure that privatization
begins in areas where there is a good chance for success.'9 9 Through
promotion of the private sector provisions and increased efficiency in
public investment, Nicaragua's infrastructure services will im-
200prove.
IV. THE BURDEN OF THE PAST: FAILED
ECONOMIC POLICIES
A. LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON FREE TRADE AND FDI
Foreign investors should understand that the social and economic
policies of Latin America were not developed from capitalism, and
that Latin America has always been averse to foreign "ln "
This "xenophobia" dates back to the conquest of the indigenous peo-
196. See id.
197. See WORLD BANK, supra note 10, at 9 (stating that the losses of electricity
generated, and water produced, are excessively high).
198. See id.
199. See id. For example, the state telecommunications company, ENITEL, was
scheduled for sale before the end of 1998. See id.
200. The World Bank Group, supra note 180, at 2.
201. See Baker, supra note 39, at 313.
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pie of Latin America by the European conquistadors.:": In modem
times, this attitude can also be attributed to the exploitive imperial-
ism of the 20th century.: ' Latin America does not have a history of a
single, dominant, well-established economic tradition; rather, its
economic ideology is a result of the combination of indigenous
communal societies and exploitive colonization!' Today's Latin
America consists of modem skyscrapers towering over slums, a stark
juxtaposition of its new capitalist endeavors and its old mercantile
history.
205
B. THE FALSE DICHOTOMY: REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
vs. FDI
After World War II, Latin American nations "pursued [regional]
economic integration as the panacea to their economic woes.,: Re-
sults have been mixed. The current Nicaraguan government's per-
spective, as expressed by Nicaraguan Vice President Enrique Bola-
nos Geyer, is that regional trade has flourished throughout the post-
World War II era, and that Nicaragua has at times benefited signifi-
cantly from it.207 Other commentators have asserted, however, that
early regional trade agreements, like the 1951 bilateral trade pact
between Nicaragua and Guatemala, failed to increase trade, and that
during the 1970s and 1980s, regional trade was undermined by dif-
fering political ideologies-more specifically, the rise of nationalis-
tic, authoritarian, and totalitarian regimes."
202. See id.
203. See id. (commenting that Latin America's mercantile history cannot be
disregarded).
204. See id. at 312 (stating that coloniahsts were interested in religious
conversion and exploiting natural resources).
205. See id. at 313-14 (noting that for a North American to understand Latin
America, it is important to have a broad view of its situation).
206. See Baker, supra note 39, at 313.
207. See generally ENRIQUE BOLAqOS GEYER, EN POc'AS PALABRAS ....
NICARAGUA: 165 ANOS DE VIDA INDEPENDIENTE 20-23 (1987) (on file with
American Universit, International Law Review).
208. See Baker, supra note 39, at 316-18. For example, Mercursor partners
Argentina and Brazil were until the 1980s embroiled in a nationalistic rivalry that
"culminated in a race to build an atomic bomb." Anthony Faiola, Spat Imperils S.
American Trading Bloc, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1999, at A 19.
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Today, Latin American nations are again attempting to integrate
their economies through a plethora of free trade arrangements like
MERCURSOR, NAFTA, the FTAA, the Group of Three, the An-
dean Pact, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Central
American Common Market (CACM), the Association of Caribbean
States (ACS), and the Latin American Integration Association
(LAIA). 209 But those who have been disappointed by similar efforts
in the past now argue that these nations should focus less on regional
trade agreements and more on strengthening their own economies
first through increased FDI. 2'0 For example, Mark B. Baker, associate
professor of business law at the University of Texas, Austin, has
written that:
Integrating the Americas can only do so much for Latin economies. Latin
nations will eventually realize that free trade is only good if there are
things to sell. For the moment, they should devote more efforts to encour-
age FDI. They should try to build up their economies and ensure that the
necessary political and social institutions are in place. This is not to say
that Latin America currently has poor political and social institutions, but
one can argue that they could stand to be upgraded."'
Baker calls upon Latin American governments to attract FDI by
making the regulation of investments more transparent, consistent,
and predictable.2 2 For example, he is critical of so-called "opera-
tional codes," also known as "drawer regulations," which differ in
their application from the investment laws that are formally in place.
University of Florida law professor Michael W. Gordon has noted
that the operational codes issued by the various ministries in devel-
oping countries, while not labeled "secret," have not been widely
disseminated in the public either. As a result, they are often applied
inconsistently. "They are kept in a ministry official's drawer, re-
209. See Baker, supra note 39, at 319.
210. See id. at 330 (commenting that current level of FDI into Latin America is
still insufficient); see also Richard Bernal, Regional Trade Arrangements in the
Western Hemisphere, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 683, 712 (1993) (stating that
intraregional agreements have not made a contribution to intraregional trade in
Latin America during the past 30 years).
211. Baker, supra note 39, at 330.
212. See id. at 336-39.
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moved on one occasion, and left in the drawer on another.""
According to Baker, one effect of operational codes is that "in-
vestors are left confused as to the current applicability of the invest-
ment regulations. 21 4 Therefore, he contends, "Latin nations need to
bridge the gap between the public code and the operational code on
foreign investments."2 5 Baker has also proposed the adoption of a
multinational Charter of Economic Rights, Duties and Obligations of
Foreign Investors, which favors FDI. ' "
Yet regional integration and increased FDI within individual
economies are not mutually exclusive goals. In fact, the key to suc-
cess is the same for both: continued progress toward democratiza-
tion. If Latin America's attempts at regional integration are to suc-
ceed this time around, it may be for the singular reason that at this
point in history, the "rising tide in democracy" throughout the world
has made economic growth driven by FDI possible." Former United
States President Bill Clinton is known to have held this view. "' At
213. Id. at 337 (quoting Michael W. Gordon. 01.4spirations and Operations:
The Governance of Multinational Enterprises b" Third World Nations, 16 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 301, 333-34 (1984)).
214. Baker, supra note 39, at 337.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 340-43; see also Wesley Scholz, International Regulation o]"
Foreign Direct Investment, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 485 (1998) (discussing the
potential benefits to developing countries of having in place a regime designed to
protect the interests of foreign investors, such as the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI) proposed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD)).
217. See Baker, supra note 39, at 325 (stating that the Summit of the Americas
was the perfect event to cultivate this support).
218. See id. (noting that President Clinton and the leaders of thirty-three other
Western nations concluded the Summit of the Americas by signing a document
calling for a free trade zone in the 21 st century). For a discussion of the American
view that democracy and FDI-driven economic development go hand-in-hand, see
Hunter R. Clark, African Renaissance and U.S. Trade PolicY. 27 G\. J. I\T'L &
COMP. L. 265, 276 (1999):
From its inception, the U.S. has asserted that the legitimate exercise of gov-
ernment power derives from the consent of the governed, expressed through
democratic mechanisms that allow for full participation in the political proc-
ess. The failure or refusal to provide truly representative government gives
impetus to what James Madison called the -'violence of faction," which un-
dermines social, political, and economic stability. An unstable climate in not
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the 1994 Summit of the Americas, Clinton hailed the document
calling for the establishment of the FTAA as a "watershed in the
history of the hemisphere. ""9
C. WHY DEMOCRACY MATTERS
Why does democracy matter? Democracy matters because, other
factors aside, poor countries remain so when bad governments make
harmful economic and social policies. Those policies cannot be ef-
fectively reformed or reversed unless those in power are held ac-
countable for the ill effects of their unwise or self-interested deci-
sion-making. Dictators are not accountable to their people; they are
insulated from redress for the bad decisions they make. By contrast,
democratic leaders are subject to the rule of law and must further-
more answer to an electorate empowered to hold them accountable
for their misdeeds or poor exercise of judgment.
The UNDP recently called for a new global strategy against pov-
erty that would include making governments more accountable to
their people, especially in the developing world, where bad govern-
ment is so often to blame for poverty.22 In its Overcoming Human
Poverty, UNDP Poverty Report 2000, the UNDP emphasized the
need for democratization in the battle against poverty-for free elec-
tions and political mobilization at the grassroots level-to ensure that
those in power respond to the needs of their people. The report
states:
Even when a country tries to implement economic policies to foster pro-
poor growth and mount targeted poverty programmes, inept or unrespon-
conducive to investment.
According to Madison, liberty has many advantages, including a "tendency to
break and control the violence of faction." Therefore, in the U.S. view, repre-
sentative democracy is the most effective means of creating the type of stable
climate in which private investors prosper. Generally speaking, President
Clinton has asserted that "stability in the 2 1st century will require high levels
of freedom." (Citations omitted.)
219. See Baker, supra note 39, at 325 (commenting that the "watershed" is to be
found in a desert of individual states' protectionist interests).
220. United Nations Development Programme, Overcoming Human Poverty:
UNDP Poverty Report 2000, available at http://www.undp.org/poverty.report
/ENGLISH/Arfront.pdf. ("Effective governance is often the missing link between
anti-poverty efforts and poverty reduction.").
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sive governance institutions can nullify the impact.
When governments are unaccountable or corrupt, poverty reduction pro-
grammes have little success in targeting benefits. The poor cannot gain a
hearing for their views from undemocratic and authoritarian political re-
gimes. They cannot gain access to public services from an unresponsive
central bureaucracy-or know that services exist if they lack information.
Even when services are decentralized, the poor might not benefit if a local
elite diverts the resources for its own interests....
Holding governments accountable to people is a bottom-line requirement.
Having regular elections-free and fair--can bolster accountability!"
Furthermore, reports issued annually since 1996 by the Economic
Freedom Network (EFN), an association of research institutes based
in fifty-five nations around the world, suggest strongly that poor
countries' lack of economic progress has more to do with the way
they are governed than with natural disadvantages or the metaphori-
cal deck being stacked against them by the wealthy nations. 2 The
reports contain the indexed results of studies of over 100 nations
since 1970, all of which lead to the inescapable conclusion that "the
freer the economy, the higher the growth and the richer the peo-
ple." 2 3 The most recent report defined the "core ingredients" of eco-
nomic freedom as "personal choice, protection of private property,
and freedom of exchange."' 4 According to the report's authors:
Individuals have economic freedom when: (a) their property acquired
without the use of force, fraud, or theft is protected from physical inva-
sions by others and (b) they are free to use, exchange, or give their prop-
erty to another as long as their actions do not violate the identical rights of
others.
221. Id.
222. For an analysis of the work done by the EFN, see 20th Centur' Survey:
Free to be poor, ECONOMIST, Sept. 11, 1999. at 27-29 [hereinafter 20th Centuir
Survey].
223. Id. at 28.
224. James Gwartney et al., Economic Freedom of the World: 20W) Annual Re-
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This should not be mistaken as a call for laissez-faire capitalism.
Instead, the EFN studies emphasize that "economic freedom is a
broad concept, which requires a great deal from government if it is to
work its living-standard-enhancing magic.""22 In one assessment of
the EFN's work, the proper role of government was interpreted as
follows:
Government needs to set a clear and predictable regulatory and macro-
economic climate: protecting property rights, enforcing the law, avoiding
inflation and, just as important, not grabbing all the money for itself.
Things must be arranged in a way that gives people an incentive to invest.
And investment means not just building factories or clearing land for
farms, but also, for example, deciding to educate children or offering
training to workers.227
Historically, Latin Americans have not had the chance to let the
free market work, or to hold their governments accountable for eco-
nomic failures. Until recently, insular despotism and the bad policy-
making that tends to flow from it have been the rule rather than the
exception in Latin America. Significant change did not come until
the past quarter-century. As Hakim notes, between 1978 and 1990,
some fifteen Latin American countries moved from dictatorial re-
gimes to more democratic systems: "Only a few of them had any
significant democratic traditions, and some, such as Bolivia, El Sal-
vador, and Nicaragua, had virtually no experience with democ-
racy. 2 28 It was not until the introduction of the economic reforms
and disciplined fiscal management that accompanied this democrati-
zation that Latin America joined the world economy.22 9
In Nicaragua, a nation with no democratic tradition, the economic
turnaround began with the democratic elections of 1990 which
ousted the Sandinistas. In other words, in Nicaragua as elsewhere in
Latin America, democratization made economic progress possible.
Nicaragua's past experience with failed economic policies Linder
both rightist authoritarian regimes and leftist Sandinista rule con-
226. 20th Centuly Survey, supra note 222, at 28.
227. Id.
228. Hakim, supra note 58, at 105 (emphasis added).
229. See id. (noting the importance of democratization and economic and fiscal
reforms).
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vinced the current generation of leaders that freedom and economic
development are inextricably bound.
Persistent problems like those which stem from its weak judicial
system, opaque regulatory framework, and unsettled disputes over
property rights, evidence the fact that Nicaragua's democratization is
far from complete. But significant progress has been made. For ex-
ample, EFN's The Economic Freedom of the J orld project gave
Nicaragua an economic freedom rating of 6.9 out of ten for 1997,
with ten representing the most free and zero the least free of coun-
tries2 0 This placed Nicaragua fifty-sixth out of 119 nations on the
EFN freedom index." ' For 1990, the last year of Sandinista rule,
Nicaragua had rated only a 2.9 on the EFN scale, or 107th out of 115
countries.- To appreciate fully how far Nicaragua has progressed
politically and economically in the short span since then requires an
understanding of whence it started and how far it had to go.
V. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MODERN NICARAGUA
A. NICARAGUA AND THE UNITED STATES
Nicaragua loomed large in the American Cold War psyche
throughout the decades of the 1970s and 1980s.2" The United States
feared that the Sandinista regime would align with Fidel Castro's
Cuba and position Nicaragua within the former Soviet Union's
230. See Economic Freedom Network, The Economic reedon of the Worl
project, available at http://www,.fraserinstitute.ca publications book6,'
econfree_2000/section_12/nicaragua.html.
231. See Economic Freedom Network, Countrv In/ormation Vttragtta, aval-
able at http://vww.freetheworld.com/cgi-bin/freetheworld, getinfo.cgi.
232. See id. (noting statistics that made Nicaragua one of the least free nations
on earth).
233. See generally MORRIS H. MORLEY, WASHINGTON, SOMUL-X, AND THE
SANDINISTAS: STATE AND REGIME IN U.S. POLICY TOVARD NICAR.ALUA, 1969-
1981 (1994); ON TRIAL: REAGAN'S WAR AGAINST NICARAGUA (Marlene Dixon
ed., Synthesis Publications 1985): SHIRLEY CHRISTIAN. NIARA6UA: REVOLLTION
IN THE FAMILY (1985) (describing the strategic importance of Nicaragua to the
United States' defense and foreign policy during the Cold War in the 1980s).
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sphere of influence. 3 ' The Reagan administration made Nicaragua a
centerpiece of its policy that came to be known as the "Reagan Doc-
trine., ," By the terms of that doctrine, the United States aggressively
implemented policies aimed at stemming the rising tide of leftist in-
surgencies across Latin America and around the world. In Nicara
gua, the United States pursued a two-pronged strategy. It conducted
an undeclared war of attrition against the Sandinistas while at the
same time emphasizing the need for free elections. "
The United States had since the enunciation of the Monroe Doc-
trine in 1823 claimed the Western hemisphere as a region of vital
interest, off-limits to outsiders.2 " The United States always acted ac-
cordingly, exercising its power overtly and covertly to influence
Latin nations' policies and internal affairs in whatever way was per-
ceived to be in the best interest of the United States. In its dealings
234. See generally ON TRIAL: REAGAN'S WAR AGAINST NICARAGUA, supra
note 233.
235. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1311-
12 (2d. ed. 1995) (quoting a speech by United States President Ronald Reagan in
which he described the "Reagan Doctrine"): "We stand with ordinary people who
have had the courage to take up arms against Communist tyranny. This stand is at
the core of what some have called the Reagan Doctrine." Id. Reagan gave this
speech before the National Defense University on October 25, 1988, near the end
of his presidency. See id.
236. See id. at 1312 (noting that the Reagan Administration provided financial
and military assistance to "freedom fighters" in Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambo-
dia, and the Nicaraguan Contras).
237. For a discussion of characteristic diplomatic maneuvering between the
United States and Sandinistas over the free elections issue, see Hunter R. Clark,
Nicaragua: Sincerity or "Very Tricky"-A Puzzling Sandinista Move, TIME, Oct.
8, 1984, at 54.
238. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 235, at 1311 (describing the Monroe
Doctrine). In its original form, the Monroe Doctrine aimed to prevent any new
colonization of the Western Hemisphere by the European powers, but it subse-
quently underwent a number of interpretations and transformations. See id. For ex-
ample, President Lyndon B. Johnson used the Monroe Doctrine to justify sending
American troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965 to quell a communist insur-
rection. See id. "The American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the
establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere." See
id. at 1174-75 (quoting a nationally televised address by President Johnson on May
2, 1965). The idea that there should be "no more Cubas" in the Americas was a re-
sounding and recurrent theme of United States foreign policy throughout the Cold
War era. See MORLEY, supra note 233, at 86.
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with Nicaragua, the United States was penultimately pragmatic. It
seemed not to matter who Nicaragua's leader was as long as he was
responsive to United States concerns. The United States "aided and
abetted strongman rule that grossly and systematically violated hu-
man rights" in Nicaragua and elsewhere. "'  Nor did the United States
make a secret of its "realist" approach to Latin America. President
Harry S. Truman once said of General Anastasio Somoza Garcia,
whose family ruled Nicaragua dictatorially for almost a half-century,
"he's a bastard but he's our bastard."24 1
Notwithstanding the strategic importance ascribed to it by the
United States, Nicaragua is in fact a small country, and a society that
is, to a large extent, closed, inbred, and hostile to outside influences.
Grand geopolitical designs have had less to do with Nicaragua's in-
ternal and external politics than with internecine rivalries, and social
and caste divisions. Most Nicaraguans inhabit the country's Pacific
side, where the timber and gold deposits are concentrated. 2 These
Nicaraguans are characteristically the descendants of the Spanish or
other Europeans, or "ladinos," who are a mix of Spanish and Indian
ancestry.243 By contrast, the inhabitants of the Caribbean side of the
country are primarily Miskito Indians and descendants of black mi-
grants or slaves from the Caribbean islands.i" As Shirley Christian,
author of Nicaragua: Revolution in the Famili, has observed:
Nicaragua, then, is a small society and an inbred one, or really two such
societies, one on the Pacific side, the other on the Atlantic. It seems you
could easily count all of the last names in the country, though having the
same last name does not automatically put two people on the same side of
any issue. People who slander one another, conspire to destroy one an-
other politically or economically, or threaten to shoot one another are of-
ten cousins, or married to cousins .... Frequently, first cousins are mar-
239. Richard Feinberg, Editorial, Perspective on Central .Anerica: L.S. .Will
Foster Progress, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1999, at B9.
240. See id. (discussing the American connection to violent overthrow of demo-
cratic government of Guatemala in 1954).
241. Id. at B9.
242. See CHRISTIAN, supra note 233. at 4 (discussing the respective natural
resources of each coast).
243. See id. (describing the region's demographic history).
244. See id.
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ried to each other. The justifications that are usually offered for such close
marriages are that they keep landholdings in the family or that they pro-
tect descendants of the old Spanish families from marrying beneath them-
selves, although this doesn't explain why such marriages are common
among the poor as well as the affluent. Making a disparaging remark
about another person to almost anyone is dangerous because the person
you are talking to could be his relative and childhood friend .... At times
the greater political and social questions seem irrelevant.24
5
B. THE SOMOZA DICTATORSHIP (1937-1979)
Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, Nicaragua had two
major political parties: Liberals and Conservatives. Their main dis-
tinction was how they viewed the Roman Catholic Church. The Con-
servatives believed the Church should be influential in government;
the Liberals thought otherwise.24 ' Each party had what was consid-
ered its own capital: the Liberals' in Leon; the Conservatives' in
Granada.247 As a practical matter, however, conflicts between the
parties usually found their geneses in personal power struggles.40
According to Christian, "It cannot be said that the United States gov-
ernment found either the Liberals or the Conservatives more to its
liking. Like the Nicaraguans themselves, the United States tended to
find the personalities more compelling.
249
During the 1920s, the power struggle between the Conservatives
and Liberals escalated into civil war, which required the intervention
of United States Marines to protect foreign holdings and to keep
ports and customs houses open."50 It was during this time that two
major personalities in Nicaraguan history, Anastasio Somoza Garcia
and Augusto Cesar Sandino, began to make themselves known.20'
245. CHRISTIAN, supra note 233, at 4-5.
246. See id. at 5.
247. See id. at 5 (discussing the political centers of the respective parties).
248. See id. (depicting the groups as closer to tribes led by competing warlords,
rather than organized political parties).
249. Id.
250. See CHRISTIAN, supra note 233, at 8 (discussing American intentions for
military buildup on both coasts).
251. See id.
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Both men were Liberals, with the former being politically shrewd
and the latter a military strategist better suited to the battlefields.' 2
Somoza Garcia's ancestors had been prominent members of the
Liberal armies in the 19th century, whereas Sandino was the illegiti-
mate son of an affluent landowner and who had joined the Liberals
after working as a mechanic.::: Somoza Garcia, who had studied in
Philadelphia and spoke English, eventually gave up fighting and be-
came an interpreter for United States Secretary of State Henry L.
Stimson, who had been sent to Nicaragua by President Calvin Coo-
lidge to resolve the Nicaraguan crisis. Sandino, on the other hand, led
the guerilla movement, supported at the time by revolutionary Mex-
ico.21 He refused to accept American arbitration and led his troops
against the Marines until they left Nicaragua in 1933.2" On February
21, 1934, Sandino was murdered on orders from Somoza Garcia by
members of the Nicaraguan National Guard, the army that the
American Marines had helped to organize.:'" The United States had
installed Somoza Garcia as the National Guard's commander!"
Thus, the stage was set for what was to become a forty-two year dy-
nasty under the Somoza name. The Sandinistas ruled for eleven years
after that, determined to redeem the legacy of the person for whom
their party was named. All that has since followed is still a work in
progress.
The Somoza dictatorship lasted from 1937 to 1979.'" General
Anastasio Somoza Garcia, the first Somoza to come to power in
Nicaragua, served not only as the political leader, but also as head of
the military. This was a time when the rest of the world was experi-
encing a wave of militarism, for which men like Chiang Kai-shek in
China, Adolf Hitler in Germany, and Benito Mussolini in Italy be-
252. See id.
253. See id. (describing the family histories of the two men).
254. See NEILL MACAULAY. THE SANDINO AFFAIR 8 (1998) (explaining how
U.S. Marine intervention intended to prevent victory, by forces supported by
Mexico).
255. See id. (describing General Sandino's guerrilla campaign against the U.S.
Marines).
256. See id. (addressing General Sandino's murder after American withdrawal).
257. See id. (discussing the selection of Somoza Garcia by the United States).
258. DOING BUSINESS IN NICARAGUA, supra note 28, at 16.
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came the models. :9 Somoza Garcia was determined that his sons
would succeed him, and sent them to study in the United States as
preparation.2 ' His son Luis was groomed for political leadership, and
Anastasio Somoza Garcia II, or "Tachito," as he was called, was sent
to the United States Military Academy at West Point to prepare him
to run the National Guard.
2 6'
Conservative opposition to Somoza Garcia was based on more
than political ideology. Corruption was rampant during his tenure, he
acquired wealth for himself through questionable means, and he took
kickbacks from people he helped along the way. 6 2 Somoza Garcia
was also adept at manipulating the United States government for the
greater good of his family, a diplomatic maneuver his sons would
learn to perfect.
213
It is not difficult to understand why there might have been little to
no FDI in Nicaragua during Somoza Garcia's reign. World War II
loomed, and the world was preoccupied with other matters. Besides,
why would prospective foreign investors choose to do business in a
country led by a man who shared Hitler's and Mussolini's socio-
political ideals? At the same time, it can hardly be said that, for his
part, boosting Nicaragua's economy with FDI was foremost in So-
moza Garcia's mind. He was in it for himself. In fact, in 1945, So-
moza Garcia enacted a Labor Code with the slogan "lead [as in bul-
lets] for the enemy, stick [as in clubs] to the indifferent, and silver
[as in coins or money] for the friends."'26
Somoza Garcia was assassinated by a lone gunman at a party in
1956 and, as planned, Luis took over the presidency while Tachito
took over the National Guard.2 " Luis served only one term, choosing
259. See GEYER, supra note 207, at 19.
260. See CHRISTIAN, supra note 233, at 23 (discussing his sons' enrollment in
military preperatory school in Staten Island, New York).
261. See id. (addressing Somoza's auctioning of foreign assets and amassing of
wealth).
262. See id. at 28.
263. See id. (describing how Somoza manipulated the United States even as he
aligned with it politically).
264. GEYER, supra note 207, at 19.
265. See CHRISTIAN, supra note 233, at 28.
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to hand pick a successor, Rene Schick, who won the 1963 elec-
tions.26 ' However, against Luis's wishes, Tachito decided to run for
president in 1967. Yet, because Luis died of a heart attack that same
year, Tachito had no effective opposition."" The following passage
from Christian's book describes the way the Somozas ran the country
throughout their dynasty:
Nicaragua under the Somoza brothers, as it had been throughout history,
was a place where almost any problem could be straightened out by rela-
tives, friendships or money. Like their father, the sons constantly added to
the family's wealth.... As authoritarian regimes go. this one ceded to its
political enemies and critics a relatively large amount of space to act in
public life. By the 1970s the second Tachito liked to point out to skeptical
journalists and diplomats that there could be no better proof of his tolerant
nature than the fact that he allowed his chief political foe, Pedro Joaquin
Chamorro Cardenal, to continue publishing La Prensa, the newspaper
with the largest circulation in Nicaragua .... What the Somozas would
never entertain was the idea that they should permit the opposition, how-
ever moderate, to come to power.
According to Nicaragua's current vice president, Bolanos Geyer,
the Nicaraguan economy mostly held its own during the Somoza
years, despite the Somozas' faults. In 1950, as a result of the Korean
conflict and the threat of a third World War, the price of cotton be-
gan to sky-rocket-so much so that cotton became the driving force
in Nicaragua's economic development for the next three decades.:"
In addition, trade among Central American countries began to inten-
sify. 270 Between 1950 and 1960, Fidel Castro emerged in Cuba, and
insurgent groups began to threaten the Somozas' rule. Nevertheless,
Nicaragua's economy continued to prosper due to the demand for
cotton.27'
By the end of 1960, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nica-
266. See id. at 28-29.
267. See id. at 2 (discussing Luis' death and Tachito's election).
268. Id. at 24-25. Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal was the husband of future
president Violeta Chamorro and an ex-classmate of Tachito's. See hL at 25
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ragua had entered into a regional trade pact that, in Geyer's view,
had a positive impact on the evolution of Central America's econ-
omy.272 This trade agreement stimulated industry in Nicaragua such
that the value of Nicaragua's exports to other Central American na-
tions increased from $2.5 million, when the treaty was originally
signed in 1960, to $146 million by 1978.273
In fact, according to Geyer, Nicaragua's economy thrived
throughout the decade of the 1960s as it never had before, or since.1
74
Then, in December 1972, Nicaragua experienced a series of earth-
quakes that devastated eighty percent of the buildings in the capital
city of Managua (pop. 1 million), and killed approximately 10,000
people.2 5 Nicaragua received hundreds of millions of dollars in dis-
aster relief from the United States and other countries, but many
people soon began complaining about how the relief money was
spent.2" During the relief effort, Nicaragua's economy was mainly
controlled by three different factions: the Somozas and their business
and farming interests; the Pellas group, a large family that owned
Nicaragua Sugar Estates Limited; and a third group, which consisted
of virtually everybody else who was in business or owned farm
land.7
The last group was made up of both Liberals and Conservatives
and they represented the "degree of modem capitalism that existed in
Nicaragua. 27' This was the group that had the most problems with
Anastasio "Tachito" Somoza. 9 In March 1974, the Superior Council
of Private Initiative ("COSIP") - an umbrella organization that
grouped together business and professional people who dominated
industry and commerce - released a statement accusing Somoza of
272. See id. at 23.
273. See id.
274. See id. at 24.
275. See CHRISTIAN, supra note 233, at 30 (describing the impact of the
Managua earthquake).
276. See id.
277. See id. at 30.
278. Id. at 31 (showing the group's discontent with the way Somoza coordinated
the earthquake recovery program).
279. See id. at 31 (describing COSIP as using grassroots development programs
to help farmers and small businesses).
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corruption in the use of funds.2' The allegation represented private
enterprise's first public break with Somoza.2" Among other things,
they accused Somoza of failing either to complete work on replace-
ment housing for the poor or to rebuild Managua's commercial cen-
ter, and of favoring his supporters when granting business recovery
loans.
282
The ground had started shifting out from under Tachito Somoza in
1976, when Jimmy Carter was elected President of the United States.
Upon taking office, Carter emphasized human rights in American
foreign policy, and hinted that the United States would no longer tol-
erate right-wing dictatorships.2 3 Recognizing this, Adolfo Calero, a
leader of the Conservative Party, told Tachito bluntly, "You're going
to lose your best friends, the gringos. They are saying that they are
going to make life impossible for you. They are going to try and get
your ass." Somoza arrogantly suggested otherwise. "Aw, you think I
have no friends in Washington. I can take care of Carter. ' ' A
Throughout all of this, insurgent guerilla groups were on the rise
throughout Central and South America.2'4 Such groups carried on
their struggle as the Sandinistas plotted their resurgence. The
Sandinista regime ultimately took control of the Nicaraguan govern-
ment on July 20, 1979.288
C. THE SANDINISTA REGIME (1979-1990)
During the Somozas' reign, Nicaraguan exiles in Cuba formed the
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). : " Financed and en-
couraged by Fidel Castro, the FSLN also maintained a presence in-
280. See id. (stemming from the Alliance for Progress era, COSIP's main
objectives were "to assist subsistence farmers and small business cooperatives").
281. See CHRISTIAN, supra note 233, at 31.
282. See id. (discussing Somoza's preference in granting recovery loans to
supporters and placing high tax rates on imports to aid recovery).
283. See id. at 34-35.
284. Id. at 36.
285. See GEYER, supra note 207, at 25-35.
286. See id.
287. See MACAULAY, supra note 254, at 8 (explaining how Anastasio Somoza
Debayle's accession to the presidency in the 1960s marked the end of the Somoza
leadership's earlier liberalizing trend).
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side Nicaragua, which allowed it to exploit the last members of the
Somoza dynasty's shortfalls. As Neill MacAulay chronicles in his
history of the Sandinista movement, The Sandino Affair, the FSLN
Sandinistas maintained a strong faith in state-directed collectivism
and a feeling of solidarity with the Cuban regime that helped support
them. 88
But what was the FSLN? The group was founded by three men
who had been active in leftist student movements during the 1950s:
Carlos Fonseca, Tomas Borge, and Silvio Mayorga.28 The Sandin-
istas started their military campaign in the jungles of the Miskito re-
gion of Nicaragua, and after several failed attempts to occupy certain
territories, the group struggled to keep its viability throughout the
1960s.2" In 1969, the FSLN released its "Historic Program," which
addressed economic and social goals such as redistributing the land
and wealth through a variety of measures; expropriating private
properties; improving the status of women and minorities; and pro-
viding better health care and education.2 9' Politically, the FSLN
promised to respect human rights and individual freedoms, and to
"govern through a revolutionary structure." 2"
At first, Somoza paid little attention to the Sandinista Front, pre-
suming it to be dead.2 93 Then in December 1974, a small group of
Sandinistas raided a Christmas party that was being held in honor of
the United States ambassador, Turner Shelton.94 The group seized a
foreign minister and several Somozan associates.'9 In return for their
hostages' release, the Sandinistas demanded, and ultimately received,
288. See id. at 9 (mentioning that greed and moral corruption led Somoza
Debayle to alienate segments of the Nicaraguan population and ultimately caused
the regime's demise).
289. See CHRISTIAN, supra note 233, at 27 (noting the Marxist influences upon
the student leaders).
290. See id. (describing three failed attempts by the Sandanistas).
291. See id. at 29 (describing the FSLN's political, economic and social
blueprint for Nicaragua's future).
292. Id.
293. See id. at 31-32.
294. See CHRISTIAN, supra note 233, at 31-32 (describing the chronology of




a $1 million ransom from the government, the release of fourteen
imprisoned Sandinista colleagues the publication of a long commu-
niqu6 attacking Somoza, and a flight to Cuba.:" Their actions, how-
ever, split the Sandinista Front into three different factions: 1) the
Proletarian Faction; 2) the advocates of a more Maoist strategy of
peasant war; and 3) the "terceristas," who believed in reaching out to
non-Marxists in order to "produce a quick victory through mass in-
surrection. ' ' 7 Among the members of this last group were Daniel
Ortega and his brother Humberto, who, at least at the time, was the
more predominant player of the two.:"
The Ortega brothers, both of whom joined the FSLN as teenagers,
came from a lower-middle-class family.2" Their father had been
jailed for supporting Sandino, and later became involved in the
Sandinista Front." In 1977, Humberto Ortega wrote a political tract
entitled The General Political-Afilitary Platform o" Struggle of the
Sandinista Front for National Liberation, an effort to seek an alli-
ance with the bourgeoisie. 1' In it, he outlined a political strategy that
included the following elements:
(1) development of a program of government without leftist rhetoric; (2)
creation of a broad anti-Somoza front with non-Marxist opposition
groups; (3) creation of mass organizations to support the FSLN; (4) agita-
tion to bring about the radicalization of the moderate opposition; (5) ac-
tions to undermine the integrity of the National Guard: and (6) unification
of the three FSLN factions under a joint leadership. 
L
This "minimum plan" further proposed a government based on
three tenets: political pluralism, "mixed" private and state enter-
prises; and international nonalignment.""
296. See id. at 32.
297. Id. It was the terceristas who organized the Christmas Raid.
298. See CHRISTIAN, supra note 233, at 37. For a discussion of Daniel Ortega,
see infra page 797-798.
299. See id.
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The Nicaraguan Revolution of 1979 led to almost ten years of civil
war that destroyed Nicaragua's economy. °4 Once in power, the
Sandinistas abandoned all pretense of pluralism and incrementally
initiated a totalitarian, Marxist-Leninist state that was modeled after
Cuba and aligned with the former Soviet Union.' 05 For the Sandin-
istas, the end justified the means, and any agreement made prior to
their taking power, whether with outsiders or the Nicaraguan people,was onsiereda burgeis " .106
was considered a bourgeois ideal. From the beginning of their re-
gime, the Sandinistas violated every promise of democratization the
people had counted on.3°7 Not only did they prevent continued eco-
nomic growth, but they also reversed the economic gains that had
been achieved until then.
0 8
Almost immediately, the Sandinistas began destroying any chance
for foreign investment through systematic and widespread nationali-
zation, with no promise of compensation." The Sandinista govern-
ment seized Nicaragua's television stations, a majority of the radio
stations, and all but one of the newspapers.30 At the same time, the
government took charge of the trade unions and education."' The
Sandinistas almost gained control of the Catholic Church in Nicara-
gua.1 2 They also nationalized the gold and limestone mines, local
banks and financing companies, and insurance firms, along with an
endless list of businesses and other enterprises involved in domestic
and foreign commerce, salaries, and foreign currency exchange.
Needless to say, prospective foreign investors stayed away. Why
would private investors want to invest in a country where a commu-
304. See DOING BUSINESS IN NICARAGUA, supra note 28, at 16.
305. See Gonzalo J. Facio, Incumpliniento Sandinista del Plan de Paz, VISION,
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nist government had complete control of all assets?"' No foreign di-
rect investor would wish to invest under a regime that refused to
promise just, immediate, and effective compensation for nationaliza-
tion or expropriation by the government.
Despite the disastrous effect of Nicaragua's war with the contras
and the United States, the Sandinistas achieved their primary objec-
tive-winning 5 They could not, however, win the most important
things necessary to govern: social peace and international legiti-
macy.16 By June 1989, Nicaragua was poorer than it had been a dec-
ade earlier." 7 In fact, the economic scenario was shocking. For ex-
ample, when the Sandinistas came to power, Nicaragua's foreign
debt was approximately $1.6 million dollars, considered gigantic at
the time."8 In just ten years, however, the Sandinistas had increased
the debt to seven times more than the total debt accumulated over the
entire forty-five years of the Somoza dictatorship. ' In 1977, the
value of Nicaragua's exports was $900 million: in 1988, exports
barely reached $230 million. 2 "' The Sandinistas' mismanagement of
the economy put Nicaragua at the mercy of the international commu-
nity, causing it to receive more aid than any other Central American
313. See id.
314. See generally Note, supra note 139 (discussing the well-accepted practice
of a state expropriating the property of foreigners only for a public purpose and
upon payment of compensation). Traditionally. what compensation was due, under
the "Hull formula," included "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation.
Latin American countries, however, relied on the "Calvo doctrine." See ul.
(asserting that aliens are entitled to no greater rights than those available to
nationals and that compensation for expropriated aliens is under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the host state's domestic courts and domestic laws, not international
law). Because a growing number of countries is accepting market-based
economies, recent trends have returned to the Hull formula. See id. at 1999
(explaining that Latin American countries are also returning to the Hull formula
because FDI inflows are vital for a country's economic growth and the idea of
protecting foreign investment continues to grow).
315. See Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, Lna Revolucion Envejecid: El Saznhnismio,
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country." ' In short, it did not take long for the Sandinista revolution
to transform Nicaragua into one of the world's worst debtor na-
tions."'
The Sandinistas were unable to reach an agreement with the
United States that would have allowed Nicaragua to receive desper-
ately needed financial assistance from the United States.32' Mean-
while, considering the country's economic plight, foreign investors
were not attracted to Nicaragua during the Sandinistas' rule, which
did not surprise their critics.24 By its end, the Sandinista dictatorship
had succeeded only in creating a huge emigrant exodus, domestic
discontent, and civil opposition.325
D. THE CHAMORRO PRESIDENCY (1990-1996)
A decade of Sandinista dictatorship ended in February 1990 when
Violeta Chamorro was elected president of Nicaragua. 2 6 Chamorro
inherited a virtually bankrupt economy. 27 In response to the crisis,
Chamorro launched an economic stabilization program in March
1991 that included reducing the size of the Nicaraguan armed forces
by 80 percent, divesting 233 state-owned enterprises; unifying the
exchange rate, and normalizing relations with the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
3 2
The Chamorro administration sent a major signal that the Nicara-
guan economy was changing course when the government began the
privatization of previously nationalized farms, using the revenue for
the repayment of debt and to encourage FDI.329 The United States re-




324. See GEYER, supra note 207, at 35.
325. See id.





FOREIGN DIRECT lVi ESTMENT
financial assistance.' Shortly thereafter, inflation in Nicaragua
dropped from an annual rate of 33,657 percent in 1988, to twelve
percent in 1993.2"' In addition, exports rose and private investment
increased to ten percent of GDP.' 2 The government also unified the
exchange rates and adjusted most import tariffs downward by be-
tween ten percent and forty percent. Free-trade zones were estab-
lished, and debt due the former Soviet Union and other Latin Ameri-
can countries was reduced by ninety percent.
Despite these and other improvements, Chamorro's critics asserted
that leftist Sandinista elements maintained effective control over the
Nicaraguan military and police?" They further complained that the
Chamorro government was not doing enough to compensate Ameri-
can citizens for properties that were confiscated by the Sandinistas,
and that these unsettled property disputes would serve to deter FDI,
especially from the United States."w
E. THE ALEMAN ADMINISTRATION (1997-2002)
Partly as a result of these and other criticisms, Arnoldo Aleman,
the "right-wing populist" ' leader of the Liberal Alliance coalition,
won Nicaragua's 1996 presidential election. The Liberal Alliance
also became the largest group in the National Assembly."' Aleman,
whose five-year term will end in January 2002, " has pledged to re-
330. See id.
331. See DOING BUSINESS IN NICARAGUA, supra note 28, at 16.
332. See id.
333. See id. at 19.
334. See John M. Goshko, U.S. to Free $50 Million lbr Manata; Vicaraguan
Prog-ess on Rights Rewarded, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1993, at A20 (noting the
criticism of American politicians who argued that the Marxist-led Sandinista
movement had retained too much power).
335. See id. (emphasizing that, despite giving Nicaragua S50 million in aid, the
United States would not continue its economic assistance unless more progress
was made in property disputes).
336. Juanita Darling, Los Angeles Times Izterviei.; Arnolo A.lenan: On Heal-
ing a Nicaragua Divided by War, Corruption antl Pover., L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26,
1997, at M3.
337. See DOING BUSINESS IN NICARAGUA. supra note 28, at 16.
338. See Cambridge International Reference on Current Affairs, .icaragua,
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store peace and democracy to the nation, boost the economy, and re-
duce Nicaragua's fiscal deficit" 9 In an interview with a Los Angeles
Times reporter conducted shortly after his inauguration, Aleman
stated his goals for his administration. Aleman expressed the hope
that, by the end of his term, "we will be on a par with the rest of
Central America in unemployment. We do not say that we are going
to eliminate poverty. That would be a bit of a lie. We are going to try
to leave Nicaragua competitive with the rest of Central America.
It may be too soon to tell whether the current government will be
able to achieve its aims, but a brief review of the current political
situation may help to determine its chances of success.
VI. NICARAGUA'S CHANCES OF SUCCESS
A. THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION
Aleman's inauguration as president on January 10, 1997 marked
the first transfer of power from one democratically elected govern-
ment to another in Nicaragua's history.14 ' The loosely knit Liberal
Alliance, which Aleman heads, is more partisan than Chamorro's
administration, which sought a reconciliation among different groups
and had no real political base.342 Due to his partisan approach, Ale-
man's administration has had difficulty removing incumbent staff
from public sector jobs and making personnel changes in the civil
service and other agencies.3 43 These and other patronage issues have
Mar. 20, 2000, available at 2000 WL 1456684 (explaining that under Nicaragua's
current constitution, which went into force in January 1987, the president is elected
by direct popular vote of the people for a five-year term, and that a president may
not serve consecutive terms, but may run again in a non-consecutive term
election).
339. See DOING BUSINESS IN NICARAGUA, supra note 28, at 16.
340. See Darling, supra note 336 (describing Aleman's goals for Nicaragua).
341. See WORLD BANK, supi-a note 10, at 4 (stating that the electoral campaign
that led to the democratic transfer of power was acrimonious and divisive, but the
election was judged impartial by international observers).
342. See id.
343. See id. (explaining that the removals and the personnel changes in some
agencies have hurt government programs and project execution, along with raising
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made some policy implementation more complicated, a matter of
some concern to aid donors.'"
The Sandinista (FSLN) leftists have, for their part, abandoned the
armed struggle, assuming instead the mantle of political opposition.
As one commentator has observed, "The idea that politics is an alter-
native to violence-and not that violence is a mere extension of
politics, as Mao and Che Guevara preached-is growing in accep-
tance."' 5 In fact, even Cuban leader Fidel Castro admits that Latin
America's days of armed struggle are over, in part because he can no
longer afford to bankroll and support leftist insurgencies.' 4 Democ-
ratization has also given leftists more room to espouse their views
and pursue their goals by working within the political system without
fear of retribution.? Lastly, the United States' shift away from right
wing dictators has helped create a less polarized political climate
throughout Latin America.
This is not to say that the Sandinistas have completely -sold out"
or been co-opted by the government. The FSLN remains an obdurate
and obstructive force, which has, according to one report, "tried to
block the government, rather than negotiate with it, organising fre-
quent strikes and protests."349 Nevertheless, the general perception is
that until a new generation of leadership emerges from within the
FSLN to modernize its mission and message, the Sandinistas' politi-
cal marginalization, like that of so many other leftist movements in
the post-Cold War era, is all but assured. ' 9' The FSLN is still con-
trolled by Daniel Ortega and Tomas Borge, its leaders for almost a
quarter-century, since the days when the FSLN was a guerrilla
movement, not an opposition political group.'1 By one assessment,
concerns in the donor community).
344. See id.
345. Clifford Krauss, Latin America 's Leftists Sa .Achos To Revolution, N.Y.
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the aging Sandinista leadership's "rigid behavior causes the FSLN to
lack an alternative project in light of the neo-liberal governmental
policies and causes internal groups to defect from [its] collectivist
policies. 3' 2
B. DEMOCRACY AT STAKE
The real threat to Aleman's government, and to Latin American
democracy in general, comes not from the left, but from the populist,
authoritarian right.5 On the one hand, "all 35 members of the Or-
ganization of American States (OAS) except one-Cuba, whose
government has been excluded from OAS participation since 1962-
are now governed by elected leaders.""3 ' As one United States official
notes, "The ballot box, and not the bullet, is now the accepted path to
office."35' On the other hand, Latin American democracy "swells and
recedes."3' 6
Disturbing recent developments suggest that democracy may again
be receding. Disconcerting events include the January 2000 military
coup that ousted Jamil Mahuad, Ecuador's popularly-elected presi-
dent,357 and the election of an authoritarian leader, Hugo Chavez, as
president of Venezuela in 1998.18 Other evidence includes the esca-
lating guerilla warfare in Colombia, and the controversy surrounding
the May 28, 2000 reelection of Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori.
A United States State Department spokesperson called the manner in
which Peru's election was conducted a "serious threat to the inter-
352. Id.
353. See John Lancaster, U.S. Sees Democracy Wane in Latin America, WASH.
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American system and its commitment to democracy." -V
In these and other instances, those whose actions appeared to un-
dermine democracy enjoyed significant popular support. According
to the United States, this is due to "popular frustration in Latin
America toward elected governments under siege from corruption,
income inequality and narcotics trafficking ...... According to Eric Ol-
son of the nonprofit Washington Office on Latin America, "What
you have here is growing popular discontent, massive social or
popular movements that just have become so dissatisfied that they
threaten or challenge the civilian authorities.""' In Olson's view,
"The risk here is that by merely reestablishing a constitutional order
and not dealing with the underlying problems that brought about this
crisis, democracy is under threat in Latin America.""'
The dilemma for democratic, free market reformers is that the un-
derlying problems to which Olson refers can only be addressed in
two stages.363 In the first stage, reforms that cut government spend-
ing, reduce tariffs, or privatize state-run industries can, in the short
run, raise unemployment, widen the income gap, and generally
"make economic cycles more profound."' The relief such measures
ultimately bring is usually not felt until follow-up, second stage re-
forms are implemented. 5 These second stage reforms include fairer
and strengthened tax collection, liberalized labor laws, and opera-
tional efficiencies in the institutions of government, especially in the
359. Anthony Faiola, U.S. Calls Peruvian Election InvaldL W.\S. POST, May
30, 2000, at A01; see also Michael Shifter, Editorial. The Fault Line of Latin
American Democrac, WASH. POST, May 28, 2000, at BI (analyzing the national
elections in both Peru and Venezuela and concluding that the United States should
be "profoundly concerned" about Latin America's political progress).
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workings of the courts and educational system.i66 However, the social
and financial cost, often associated with first stage reforms, have ex-
hausted public support before second stage benefits can be real-
ized. 67 As one observer expressed, "Politicians generally realize
these [reform stages] are the steps they have to take, but in the fledg-
ling democratic environment in which they operate, consensus
building is a painfully slow process. 368
Whether Nicaragua's nascent democracy can survive remains to
be seen. For the time-being, all the government can do is move for-
ward with its reform agenda and hope for the best. Even a former
opponent like Sergio Ramirez, who served as a vice president of the
Sandinista government during the 1980s, concedes, "We have a new
democracy that is very fragile. , 6 9 In the erstwhile revolutionary's
view, the nature of the struggle to democratize Nicaragua is different
from the challenges the country faced in its recent past. As Ramirez
sees it, "Now there is a different revolution, where ideology doesn't
have much importance. It's a fight to respect laws and institutions
and fight corruption."37
The OAS has collectively committed itself to resist any effort to
turn back the clock on regional democratization. In September 1997,
the Protocol of Washington was added to the OAS Charter, giving
the OAS the power to suspend the membership of any OAS state in
which a freely elected government is jeopardized.17 ' Former United
States Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott hailed the agreement
as "nothing less than a collective defense of democracy- and a col-
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Nicaraguan President Aleman, for his part, has done his best to of-
fer assurances. "This country is a democracy," he declared in a 1999
interview. 73 "Of all the countries in Central America we are the most
secure. There is no fear of crime. We respect elections. The army
does not answer to the political parties .... There is no hyperinflation
and growth is 6 to 7 percent."'"" Aleman has rejected out of hand
charges of government corruption and self-dealing, labeling such al-
legations "disinformation.'"'
VII. WHAT THE REST OF THE WORLD CAN DO
TO HELP
A. THE U.S. ROLE
1. Hunanitarian assistance
Critics of recent U.S. policy toward Nicaragua complain that when
the Cold War ended, Nicaragua's strategic importance diminished,
and the United States relegated Central American foreign policy to
its back burner. 7 6 This has certainly been true in regard to the amount
of foreign assistance provided by the United States to Nicaragua and,
for that matter, to other countries in general in recent years. One
critic has gone so far as to call the United States "the most parsimo-
nious [country] in the world when its charity is measured as a frac-
tion of available riches."'17 For example, the United States spent only
about $7 billion on nonmilitary foreign aid in 1997, an amount equal
to less than one-tenth of one percent of its gross national product of
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$8.1 trillion.378
Unfortunately, other donor nations have followed suit. In fact, in-
ternational foreign assistance dropped twenty-one percent in overall
real dollars between 1992 and 1997. Opponents of foreign aid had
long asserted that such assistance was "wasted by bloated aid agen-
cies pouring money into the pockets of corrupt Third World govern-
ments.""38 When the former Soviet Union collapsed, "Western pow-
ers no longer felt the need to purchase the Cold War loyalty of such
governments."38 ' As one commentator has observed, "With a less
threatening world beyond their borders, donor nations came under
pressure to attend to problems at home.' ' 82
Regarding Nicaragua, the United States seemed to go from a spare
no expense policy in support of the anti-Sandinista contra rebels-
the contras received more than $1 billion in U.S. military and other
assistance between 1982 and 1997-to dwindling support of only
about $35 million annually once the Sandinistas left power. ;" Given
the positive changes that have been taking place inside Nicaragua,
and the needs of its fledgling democracy, some have urged the
United States to be more forthcoming with its support. U.S. ambas-
sador to Nicaragua Lino Guitierrez went so far to warn in 1999 that
the United States ignores Nicaragua "to our peril.",
3"4
Humanitarian concern for Nicaragua's people in the devastating
wake of Hurricane Mitch appears, however, to have awakened the
United States from its apathy in regard to the well-being of its Cen-
tral American neighbor. In March 1999, President Clinton visited
storm-ravaged parts of the Nicaraguan countryside, and pledged
$120 million in assistance to improve Nicaraguan health care, build
378. See id. (noting that this figure "was the lowest percentage of any donor
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schools, and provide shelter for the roughly 4,000 people made
homeless by the hurricane.3" The United States had already sent
military personnel and heavy equipment to Nicaragua to assist with
clean up and relief efforts, and had made available some S300 mil-
lion in disaster aid throughout the Latin American region through ci-
vilian agencies and the U.S. Department of Defense.'
2. Debt relief
The Clinton administration backed the HIPC initiative. ' In addi-
tion, the United States deferred for two years all bilateral debt pay-
ments owed the United States by Nicaragua and Honduras, a collec-
tive obligation of some $54 million.3" Paul Solorzano, director of the
Central American Resource Center in Washington, D.C., referred to
the debt postponement as "an immediate measure that will enable
[the Clinton administration] to review the issue of debt in the long
term."389 In fact, Clinton promised to cancel all $5.7 billion of debt
owed the United States by thirty-six of the world's poorest countries,
including Nicaragua, provided those countries channel the money
saved into educational, health, and economic development pro-
grams. 9 On September 29, 1999, Clinton told the annual meeting of
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the World Bank and IMF, "Unsustainable debt is helping to keep too
many poor countries and poor people in poverty. ' 91 The president
asserted that poor nations should not have to "choose between mak-
ing interest payments on their debt and investing in their children's
education., 392 He declared, "Today I am directing my administration
to make it possible to forgive 100 percent of the debt these countries
owe to the United States, when-and this is quite important-when
needed to help them finance basic human needs and when the money
will be used to do so.
'393
3. The U.S.-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act
American support for Nicaragua goes beyond humanitarian assis-
tance and debt relief. The United States has launched a major trade
initiative aimed at bolstering trade and strengthening relations with
Latin American and other developing nations that have pursued eco-
nomic and political reforms. As discussed, President Clinton, on May
18, 2000, signed into law the Trade and Development Act of 2000, a
legislative package that contained the Africa Growth and Opportu-
nity Act (AGOA) and the U.S. Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership
Act (CBTPA).394 Recognizing Caribbean and Central American
countries as "an increasingly important export market for our goods,"
the CBTRA is designed to accomplish a number of objectives.
Among them: offer temporary trade benefits that will help nations
recover from the hurricane damage sustained in 1998; facilitate the
establishment of, and participation in, the FTAA; reduce or eliminate
tariffs and quotas on textiles and certain non-textile items exported to
the United States; and level the playing field between Mexico, which
enjoys trade benefits as a member of NAFTA, and other Caribbean
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B. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Nicaragua has acknowledged the importance of past help from the
international community ancL stresses the need for continued assis-
tance to help its economy grow."" Continued export increases and
debt forgiveness through the HIPC initiative should help put Nicara-
gua on the road to economic viability. " The World Bank is already
funding several projects in Nicaragua designed to improve the busi-
ness environment and infrastructure, and promote private invest-
ment.398 One example is the Roads Rehabilitation and Maintenance
Project, where the World Bank has set up a micro-enterprise con-
tracted to maintain 500 kilometers of rural roads."' Another is the
International Finance Corporation (IFC), which was established in
Nicaragua by the World Bank in 1997 to promote private investment,
Nicaragua's private sector, and investment in infrastructure, tourism,
and agribusiness.*"
Other projects implemented in Nicaragua by the World Bank in-
clude the $44 million Technology and Land Management Project,
which allows small and medium-sized farmers to increase production
and assigns property rights; the $23 million Institutional Develop-
ment Project, which assists in efficient public administration; and the
$30 million Rural Municipalities Project, designed to increase com-
munity participation in decentralized decision-making. '" All of these
projects will help to improve Nicaragua's economy, making it a
more attractive arena for foreign investors.
Individual nations are also providing assistance through their bi-
lateral relationships with Nicaragua. For example, as discussed, Tai-
wanese business leaders have already invested tens of millions of
dollars in the Las Mercedes free trade zone near Managua, and are
planning to invest another $100 million to build a cotton processing
plant in Nicaragua.*"2 In addition, Taiwan's government has formed a
396. See Inter-American Development Bank, supra note 130, at 2.
397. See WORLD BANK, supra note 10, at 6.
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strategic alliance with several Central American nations to promote
trade, investment and tourism.43 By the terms of an agreement
reached in August 1998, Taiwan will share with Central American
countries its experiences with economic development..4 " Taiwan will
focus its Central American investments in the development of agri-
cultural fishery sectors, and the promotion and development of trade
and basic infrastructure. ° In return, Central American states will
need to sign free trade agreements, investment promotion and pro-
tection agreements, and enhance small and medium-sized enter-
prises. °6 An export center will also need to be established in Central
America to coordinate with the China External Trade Development
Council (CETRA) and to promote Central American exports to Tai-
407wan.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Nicaraguans have throughout their history endured more than their
fair share of political and social turmoil, natural disasters, and pov-
erty. Fortunately, however, recent economic indicators promise a
better life for Latin Americans in general, and Nicaraguans in par-
ticular. Nicaragua seems poised for economic growth as free market
economic reforms begun during the 1990s have triggered an impres-
sive turnaround. Little more than a decade ago, Nicaragua had turned
to communism and was in a perilous state of undeclared war with the
United States. Its economy was in a shambles. By contrast, today in
Nicaragua democratization is proceeding, and civilians finally have
control over the military.08 Moreover, Nicaragua's economy has
been growing, inflation is under control, private domestic and for-
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eign investment is on the rise, and unemployment has declined."
To encourage further growth, Nicaraguan President Arnoldo Ale-
man has made attracting FDI a cornerstone of his administration's
economic policy. The Aleman administration has undertaken a num-
ber of initiatives that should make Nicaragua more attractive to pro-
spective foreign investors. These include, among other things, a new
Decree Law on Foreign Investment that is favorable to FDI; ESAF
agreements with the IMF that can qualify Nicaragua for the World
Bank's HIPC initiative and thereby make Nicaragua's external debt
more sustainable; positive changes to the tax and electoral laws; the
strengthening of Nicaragua's legal and regulatory framework; and
upgrading Nicaragua's infrastructure.
Even this brief analysis reveals, however, that Nicaragua must
overcome formidable obstacles to dispel prospective foreign inves-
tors' reluctance to invest there. Glaring deficiencies remain. These
include, among other things, the disheartening gap between rich and
poor; the need to reconcile the public codes that regulate FDI with
their informal, operational counterparts, which lack transparency;
Nicaragua's weak judicial system; and Latin Americans' traditional
aversion to outsiders, a vestige of their resentment over foreign colo-
nial and other exploitation of the region in the past. Beyond these is-
sues, it is crucial for Nicaragua to resolve as quickly as possible the
property rights disputes over confiscations carried out under the
Sandinistas.
So far, the Nicaraguan government appears to have made substan-
tial progress on all fronts. With the continued support of the United
States and other members of the international community, that prog-
ress can and should continue. For its part, the United States has pro-
vided increased economic relief to help Nicaraguans cope with the
devastation wrought by Hurricane Mitch in 1998. The United States
has also canceled or postponed a significant portion of Nicaragua's
debt to the United States. Meanwhile, international organizations like
the World Bank and the Paris Club have assisted with the restruc-
turing of Nicaragua's foreign debt to more sustainable levels. Thus
the signs are encouraging for those who wish Nicaragua success in
its struggle to achieve lasting democracy and prosperity.
409. See id.
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